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Abstract
Robert E. Lucas Jr. wrote two papers that changed the course of development of the economic sciences : “Expecta-
tions and the Neurality of Money” (1972) and “Econometric Policy Evaluation : A Critique” (1976). These papers were
explicitly cited by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences when he received the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic
Sciences. This paper is an attempt to place these papers in a historical perspective, with economics viewed as a moral
science, particularly with respect to how fundamentally Lucas changed economists’ way of understanding the decision
making modes of intertemporally motivated agents and of modeling market equilibrium of a monetary economy of such
agents. In the first paper, he modeled a monetary economy with intertemporally motivated agents under rational ex-
pectations, in which the decisions of such agents are guided by the market prices subjected to monetary and real dis-
turbances. This paper, by demonstrating how agents’ decisions differ from one policy regime to another, foreshadowed
his critique of econometric policy evaluation in the second paper, which stunned the profession and opened the door to
the development of the view that the movement of an economy is a stochastic process rather than a structural system
of the behavioral equations that are invariant to policy regimes. Lucas’ insight that the decision making modes of ra-
tional agents are intertwined intimately with the decision making environment has brought home the teleological na-
ture of rational agents in economics as a moral science.
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1. Introduction
This paper is an attempt to place the contribu-
tions of Robert E. Lucas Jr. to the economic sci-
ences in a historical perspective, with respect to
how fundamentally Lucas changed economists’
way of thinking about the decision making modes
of intertemporally motivated rational agents and
of modeling market equilibrium of a monetary
economy of such agents subjected to monetary
and real disturbances. Lucas was the first to
show that the decision rules of intertemporally
motivated agents are intertwined with the deci-
sion making environment, and to integrate in-
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tertemporal optimization and endogenous expec-
tations into the concept of market equilibrium as
rational expectations equilibrium, which led to an
alternative view of an economy as a process
rather than a structure of behavioral equations.
In the year of 1995, The Royal Swedish Acad-
emy of Sciences announced their decision to
award the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sci-
ences in Memory of Alfred Nobel to Robert Lucas
Jr., Professor of Economics, University of Chi-
cago. The award came two decades after Lucas
published two papers that revolutionized our
way of thinking in economics : “Expectations and
the Neutrality of Money,” Journal of Economic
Theory 4 (1972), and “Econometric Policy Evalu-
ation : A Critique,” Carnegie-Rochester Confer-
ence Series on Public Policy I (1976). In the Press
Release as well as in the Advance Information re-
leased by the Academy, these two papers were
cited explicitly as the contributions that made a
lasting impact on the development of economic
sciences, in many important fields of research in-
cluding investment theory［Lucas and Prescott
(1971)］, financial economics［Lucas (1978)］, mone-
tary theory［Lucas (1980a), Lucas and Stokey
(1987)］, dynamic public economics［Lucas and
Stokey (1983)], international finance ［Lucas
(1982)］, and economic growth［Lucas (1988)］. His
legacy is very much alive today, not only in the
core theory of the New Classicism founded on the
ideas of intertemporal optimization, rational ex-
pectations, and market equilibrium, but also in
the New Keynesianism that has resurged on such
new foundation as information imperfection, fric-
tional adjustment, monopoly power, and game-
theoretical modeling of the decision making envi-
ronment. Such sweeping influences can be attrib-
uted to Lucas’s way of viewing economic phe-
nomena in terms of two-way relations between
the decision making modes of rational agents and
the economic environment. It is, therefore, not
surprising that the Keynesian economics, that
had long dominated the profession in the postwar
era with its structural view of an economy (com-
prised of stable behavioral equations of consum-
ers, firms, and asset holders), has yielded some of
its presumptions and resurged with a new in-
sight that decision rules of rational agents and
the economic environment are inseparable and
with a renewed commitment that agents’ behav-
ior must be understood from a rationality princi-
ple. We often hear that the profession was and
still is divided into two camps, the New Classi-
cism and the New Keynesianism, but such char-
acterization of either camp is no longer tenable,
for whatever approach one may take, we now
share a similar aspiration that decision rules of
economic agents and the environment in which
decisions are made must be integrated by way of
a rationality principle.
Twenty five years later since the publication of
Lucas’s paper on expectations and the neutrality
of money, Rao Aiyagari organized a 25th anniver-
sary conference to celebrate this publication un-
der the sponsorship of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis. In a paper that kicked off this con-
ference, Thomas J. Sargent, who was also
awarded the Nobel Prize in economic sciences to-
gether with Christopher Sims in the year of 2011,
reflected on the days in which the paper ap-
peared and characterized it in reference to
Keynes’ General Theory :
Equilibrium macroeconomics continues ‘M.
I.T. economics’ in the ways it uses small but
self-consistent ‘parable’ economies to con-
front broad facts. From the beginning, So-
low’s one-sector growth model and his
growth residual and Samuelson’s overlap-
ping generations model were the vehicles
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that drove rational expectations revolution-
aries to the front. Many of us regard Lucas’s
1972 JET paper as the flagship of the Revolu-
tion ; it is different from the flagship of that
earlier revolution, Keynes’s General Theory
of Employment, Interest, and Money, which
was ambitious, wide-ranging, imprecise, and
vague enough to induce twenty-five years of
controversy about what the book really
meant. Lucas’s paper was a narrow, techni-
cal study of a modification of Samuelson’s
parable economy, designed to be a counter-
example to interpreting a negative
unemployment-inflation correlation as some-
thing that a particular type of monetary cum
fiscal policy could exploit. There was never
any confusion about what Lucas’s paper
meant, any more than there was about
Samuelson’s or Solow’s. If Lucas’s paper was
slow reading for macroeconomists, it was be-
cause we were unfamiliar with contraction
mappings, and with thinking of equilibria as
functions.
It extends our appreciation of Lucas’s con-
tributions to remember that he did not work
in a vacuum, and that among his many gifts
is the ability to demonstrate by choice of en-
gaging examples the importance for macro-
economic policy questions of making pre-
existing ideas fit together.
Sargent, Thomas J., JME 37 (1996), 536.
As Sargent said, Lucas’s paper was technically
demanding and provided rigorous proofs to all his
claims, but it took many years before his method
gained a stronghold in many fields of economics.
Lucas’s paper came out when I was in the second
year of graduate school in economics at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, where much effort was ex-
pended to refine a large macroeconometric model
of the United States and where economic fore-
casting conferences were held. I recall that at one
of these conferences, Professor Warren Smith
was urging monetarists to make their blackbox
explicit so that monetarists and Keynesians
might be able to have a more meaningful dis-
course. Lucas’s 1972 paper was circulated among
his colleagues as early as 1970, but many of us
had to wait till 1972. Many Keynesians at the
time must have read it with suspicion as it was
based on the quantity theory of money with em-
phasis on the neutrality of money. My own expe-
rience with this paper was one of a great sur-
prise, and it prompted me to think philosophically
about how I was viewing the world. What I
thought was a sound approach to the economic
sciences then, i.e., the positivism of the Keynesian
approach and its structural view of an economy,
had to be transcended to a different sight in or-
der to fully appreciate Lucas’s paper. It took me
some time before I was able to view an economy
as an equilibrium phenomenon and as a process.
The Keynesian theory, popular at the time, was
dominated by an epistemology founded on the
presumption that an economy has a stable behav-
ioral structure, the parameters of which can be
uncovered by econometric methods applied to
the past data. This epistemology left so many
questions unanswered : What is short-run and
long-run?, what does it mean to say that an econ-
omy is an endogenous system?, how can one iden-
tify structural parameters through econometric
methods?, how can one model forward-looking
agents with expectations endogenized?, how are
the decision rules of such agents related to an
economic environment?, how valid is it to view
economic policies as exogenous variables when
they are in fact endogenous responses of the
authorities to contingent economic situations, and
so on, while most of our effort was concentrated
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on how to uncover the true structure of an econ-
omy and use it for policy analysis.
Lucas’s papers answered many of these ques-
tions, and offered a way of modeling an economy
counter to the Keynesian method. Most impor-
tantly, he modeled economic agents as forward-
looking planners, who seek optimal actions to
take with a future economic environment taken
into account through endogenously formed ex-
pectations that will be consistent with future
market equilibrium. This was an extraordinary
accomplishment. Because of this achievement, I
have kept these two papers in the reading list of
my course in macroeconomics, and never have
failed to discuss them with my students, in order
to share with them not only their stunning contri-
butions, but also how important it is to examine
what has become conventional.
Every time I read this paper, I could not help
but sense that Lucas’s understanding of rational
agents is intimately related to Aristotelian ethics,
which speaks to the ultimate principle of human
existence as living well by exercising one’s practi-
cal wisdom (phronesis), that is, by choosing the
best means within one’s power with respect to
the particular circumstances in which such
choices are made. Our life of actions requires de-
liberation over rational actions with respect to
what is feasible and what is not, with respect to
the environment in which action plans are to be
implemented ; it also requires foreseeing of the
future environment without which planning be-
comes meaningless. Aristotle, in Nicomachean
Ethics, defines the first principle of human exis-
tence as eudaimonia, and explicates what it en-
tails in terms of deliberating over feasible means
and choosing the best ones. Influenced by Aris-
totle, Heidegger, in Being and Time, character-
izes human existence as care and ekstasis.
Whether such ekstatis is taken to mean being
thrown into the truth of being or, equivalently, as
the temporality in which human existence dis-
closes itself, human beings act for an end, under-
stand and interpret their history, and constantly
project into their ownmost possibilities. Heideg-
ger summarized such temporality by saying that
a future makes the present in the process of hav-
ing been［Heidegger (1962, §326, p. 374)］.［1］ Hu-
man beings are historical beings, and our starting
point is always given by the history of the irre-
versible path of actions we took in the past, but,
with an initial condition given, we try to choose
the best plan of actions to be carried forward.
Aristotle says : “we deliberate about things that
are in our power and can be done”, and “delibera-
tion is about the things to be done by the agent
himself”. In Book III of Nicomachean Ethics, Aris-
totle says :
We deliberate about things that are in our
power and can be done ; and these are in
fact what is left. For nature, necessity, and
chance are thought to be causes, and also
reason and everything that depends on man.
Now every class of men deliberates about
the things that can be done by their own ef-
forts. And in the case of exact and self-
contained sciences there is no deliberation,
e.g. about the letters of the alphabet (for we
have no doubt how they should be written) ;
but the things that are brought about by our
own efforts, but not always in the same way,
are the things about which we deliberate,
e.g. questions of medical treatment or of
money-making. And we do so more in the
case of the art of navigation than in that of
gymnastics, inasmuch as it has been less ex-
actly worked out, and again about other
things in the same ratio, and more also in the
case of the arts than in that of the sciences ;
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for we have more doubt about the former.
Deliberation is concerned with things that
happen in a certain way for the most part,
but in which the event is obscure, and with
things in which it is indeterminate. We call in
others to aid us in deliberation on important
questions, distrusting ourselves as not being
equal to deciding.
We deliberate not about ends but about
means. For a doctor does not deliberate
whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether
he shall persuade, nor a statesman whether
he shall produce law and order, nor does any
one else deliberate about his end. They as-
sume the end and consider how and by what
means it is to be attained ; and if it seems to
be produced by several means they consider
by which it is most easily and best produced,
while if it is achieved by one only they con-
sider how it will be achieved by this and by
what means this will be achieved, till they
come to the first cause, which in the order of
discovery is last. For the person who deliber-
ates seems to investigate and analyse in the
way described as though he were analysing
a geometrical construction (not all investiga-
tion appears to be deliberation-for instance
mathematical investigations-but all delib-
eration is investigation), and what is last in
the order of analysis seems to be first in the
order of becoming. And if we come on an im-
possibility, we give up the search, e.g. if we
need money and this cannot be got ; but if a
thing appears possible we try to do it. By
‘possible’ things I mean things that might be
brought about by our own efforts ; and these
in a sense include things that can be brought
about by the efforts of our friends, since the
moving principle is in ourselves. The subject
of investigation is sometimes the instru-
ments, sometimes the use of them ; and simi-
larly in the other cases―sometimes the
means, sometimes the mode of using it or the
means of bringing it about. It seems, then, as
has been said, that man is a moving principle
of actions ; now deliberation is about the
things to be done by the agent himself, and
actions are for the sake of things other than
themselves. For the end cannot be a subject
of deliberation, but only the means ; nor in-
deed can the particular facts be a subject of
it, as whether this is bread or has been baked
as it should ; for these are matters of percep-
tion. If we are to be always deliberating, we
shall have to go on to infinity.
The same thing is deliberated upon and is
chosen, except that the object of choice is al-
ready determinate, since it is that which has
been decided upon as a result of deliberation
that is the object of choice. For every one
ceases to inquire how he is to act when he
has brought the moving principle back to
himself and to the ruling part of himself ; for
this is what chooses. This is plain also from
the ancient constitutions, which Homer rep-
resented ; for the kings announced their
choices to the people. The object of choice
being one of the things in our own power
which is desired after deliberation, choice
will be deliberate desire of things in our own
power ; for when we have decided as a re-
sult of deliberation, we desire in accordance
with our deliberation.
Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Sec. 3.
The underline is mine.
Aristotle’s point that deliberation about the
things should be left to the agent himself is par-
ticularly important, for the same principle under-
lies microeconomics. At one of the conferences I
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attended, Milton Friedman, in a plenary session,
made a remark to the effect that the essence of
microeconomics is that each person makes his
best decisions for his end ; the deliberation on
what to choose from the feasible means should,
therefore, be left to the person making the choice,
not to any third party. The influence of Aristotle
was the mark of the Austrian School ; Hayek and
Friedman, I believe, carried the spirit of the
School with unshakable faith in free chioice.
Lucas was influenced by Friedman. I wonder if it
is just a coincidence that I detect much of the Ar-
istotelian influence in Lucas’s contributions in the
two papers? In the autobiographical account re-
leased by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sci-
ences, Lucas himself writes :
I attended Seattle Public Schools, graduat-
ing from Roosevelt High School (where my
parents had graduated in 1927) in 1955. I was
good at math and science, and it was ex-
pected that I would attend the University of
Washington in Seattle and become an engi-
neer. But by the time I was seventeen I was
ready to leave home, a decision my parents
agreed to support if I could obtain a scholar-
ship. MIT did not grant me one but the Uni-
versity of Chicago did. Since Chicago did not
have an engineering school, this ended my
engineering career. But when I began the 44
hour train trip “back east” to Chicago, I was
pretty sure something interesting would
turn up.
What to do instead? I took some mathe-
matics at Chicago, but lost interest soon after
my courses got past the material I had half
learned in high school. I did not have the
nerve to major in Physics, which is what you
did at Chicago in those days if you thought
you could make it. The real excitement for
me was in the liberal arts core of the Chicago
College, courses from the Hutchins era with
names like History of Western Civilization,
and Organization, Methods, and Principles of
Knowledge. Everything in these courses was
new to me. All of them began with readings
from Plato and Aristotle, and I wanted to
learn all I could about the Greeks. I took a se-
quence in Ancient History, and became a his-
tory major. Though I had no real idea what a
professional historian does, I had learned
that one can make a living by pursuing one’s
intellectual interests and writing about them.
I began to think about an academic career.
And, in the same autobiographical note, Lucas
writes about his experience with Milton Fried-
man’s price theory sequence.
In the fall of 1960, I began Milton Fried-
man’s price theory sequence. I had been
looking forward to this famous course all
summer, but it was far more exciting than
anything I had imagined. What made it so?
Many Chicago students have tried to answer
this question. Certainly Friedman’s brilliance
and intensity, and his willingness to follow
his economic logic wherever it led all played
a role. After every class, I tried to translate
what Friedman had done into the mathemat-
ics I had learned from Samuelson. I knew I
would never be able to think as fast as Fried-
man, but I also knew that if I developed a re-
liable, systematic way for approaching eco-
nomic problems I would end up at the right
place.
With these introductory remarks, let me turn
to the policy debate and the research agendas in
the 1960s.
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2. The rational expectations equilibrium
theory
What has come to be known as the New Classi-
cism is based on three closely-related ideas : Eco-
nomic agents’ decisions are intertemporally moti-
vated ; expectations are formed endogenously
within an economic system itself, in a manner
consistent with the formation of market prices ;
and the market clears (the demand and the sup-
ply are equilibrated continuously). Intertemporal
optimization requires formation of expectations
on future prices, and such formation is possible
only if agents know how future prices will be de-
termined, and such knowledge is possible only
under the idea of equilibrium prices (disequilib-
rium cannot inform future prices). The idea of in-
tertemporal optimization was introduced to eco-
nomics through the contributions of Ramsey
(1928), Koopmans (1965), and Cass (1965) in the
context of growth theory. But, more importantly,
in the field of macroeconomics, Friedman’s (1957)
theory of permanent income was particularly
pertinent to the debate between Keynesians and
monetarists in the 1960s and the early part of the
1970s.
The central question addressed in Friedman’s
theory of consumption concerned what the opti-
mal path of consumption would be under an ex-
pected income stream of the future. Friedman ar-
gued that consumption (permanent consumption)
is better viewed a function of permanent income.
Permanent income is that measure of income that
could be spent without changing the level of one’s
wealth, where this wealth is defined as the pre-
sent discounted value of an expected income
stream. Friedman was insisting that it is not pre-
sent income that determines present consump-
tion ; instead, consumption and saving decisions
are based on how much wealth one foresees.
which does not fluctuate from year to year de-
pending on economic conditions. This theory is,
therefore, only part of a more general view that
Friedman held, that all decisions by rational
agents, be it consumption-saving or demand for
assets (financial or physical), are ultimately re-
lated to this measure of wealth. While permanent
income is a forward-looking concept, Friedman
estimated it as an exponentially weighted sum of
the past series of income. In supporting Fried-
man’s estimation, Muth (1960) wrote a paper “Op-
timal Properties of Exponentially Weighted Fore-
casts”, and showed that there exists a stochastic
process of income such that Friedman’s distrib-
uted lag estimation is consistent with the optimal
forecasts. The contribution of this paper is impor-
tant, for it suggested for the first time that a
backwardly estimated quantity can be consistent,
under a certain stochastic process, with the opti-
mal forecasts.
Following this paper, Muth (1961) wrote an-
other path-breaking paper, “Rational Expecta-
tions and the Theory of Price Movements,” and
suggested, as a way of endogenizing expecta-
tions, that a subjective probability distribution of
expectations held by agents be identified with an
objective probability distribution of the variables
for which expectations are formed. This idea was
named ‘rational expectations’. Thus, this paper in-
troduced for the first time expectations that are
formed endogenously from an objective distribu-
tion. Such expectations contrasts with adaptive
expectations ; the latter adapts by partial correc-
tion of an error instead of foreseeing what will
happen in the future. Despite the potential power
of Muth’s idea, many kept carrying their re-
searches in the 1960s incorporating only adaptive
expectations. Muth’s theory had to wait for a dec-
ade before its power was recognized as a way of
building a consistent intertemporal equilibrium
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model.
The decade of the 1960s was dominated by the
Phillips curve controversy, by the question
whether this curve is stable enough for policy
makers to rely upon in prescribing stabilization
policies. The curve was first discovered by A.W.
Phillips (1958), who plotted the unemployment
rate and the rate of change of nominal money
wages in the United Kingdom 1861-1957, and ob-
served a negative relation between the two.
While many economists inferred from such obser-
vations that a stable relation exists between the
unemployment rate and the inflation rate and ap-
plied it to stabilization policies, Friedman (1968)
and Phelps (1967, 1968) argued that the Phillips
curve is not a permanent relation that can be ex-
ploited as a tradeoff between the unemployment
rate and the inflation rate ; while Friedman and
Phelps came to a similar conclusion, their theories
are based on different reasons［see the Nobel lec-
tures by Friedman (1976) and Phelps (2006)］).
Friedman (1968) argued : When an unanticipated
change in nominal demand (money supply) is in-
jected, the prices of goods rise. Firms measure
the marginal value product of labor using the
prices of the goods they are producing, hence
they employ more labor, as the real wage rate
falls. Workers, on the other hand, base their
consumption-leisure decisions on the average
price, or, more precisely, on the expected price
level, as they care more about the real purchas-
ing power of income. The higher wages that the
firms are willing to pay, therefore, will be per-
ceived as the higher expected real wages by the
workers, given their expectations. This leads to
higher employment and production. Thus, if, in
the short-run, the unemployment rate falls below
the natural rate due to a shock in nominal de-
mand, the actual inflation rate must be exceeding
the expected inflation rate. Such conditions can-
not persist as workers become aware of a gap be-
tween the expected and the actual, therefore
adapting their expectations to the actual move-
ment of inflation. When this adaptation has fully
caught up with the actual, the unemployment
rate returns to its natural rate. Thus, this argu-
ment was termed the natural rate theory, or the
augmented Phillips curve theory. If a nominal
shock is fully anticipated, that is, if an increase in
money supply is announced ahead of time and is
known to every agent, the real wage rate the
firms are willing to pay will be identical to the
real wage rate the workers demand, leaving the
employment of labor unchanged. It was already
clear in the theory of Friedman and Phelps that it
is unanticipated nominal shocks that can have
real effects on employment and production ; an-
ticipated nominal shocks are neutral.
The concept of adaptive expectations was an
important component of the natural rate the-
ory.［2］In the face of unanticipated shocks, agents
cannot foresee completely where an economy
will settle after such shocks, hence have no
choice but to revise their expectations after a gap
between what they anticipated and what actually
happened. The basic problem of adaptive expec-
tations, however, is that such expectations are de-
termined entirely by what happened in the past.
If you trace adaptive expectations recursively
into the past, whatever expectations agents may
have now for next year can be shown to be deter-
mined by the past price movement alone. If so,
such expectations cannot take into account
agents’ foresight into the future. It is too restric-
tive to bound expectations within the confine of
what actually happened in the past, without tak-
ing into account those future events that are an-
ticipated and their impacts on the future environ-
ment. Lucas and Rapping (1969 a, 1969 b) pre-
sented an alternative theory on why the short-
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run unemployment rate falls below its long-run
rate when the prices are above their normal lev-
els, by invoking the idea of intertemporal substi-
tution of labor with leisure. Again, the dynamic
mechanism of this process was not fundamentally
different from the idea of adaptive expectations,
although the idea of the normal level is related to
the long-run market equilibrium.
Adaptive expectations had to be overcome by
relating expectations to market equilibrium
somehow. If we recall that Muth’s theory of ra-
tional expectations was a theory of endogenous
expectations with respect to market equilibrium
(from which is obtained an objective probability
distribution of a variable for which expectations
are formed), it was inevitable that the idea of
adaptive expectations had to be overcome by
referring to this objective distribution. Once ex-
pectations are formed from a probability distribu-
tion of the equilibrium price, economic agents
must be foreseeing not only equilibrium this pe-
riod but also equilibrium in all future periods, for
equilibrium this period would not be attained
without equilibrium in all future periods. Thus,
Muth’s notion of rational expectations, when ap-
plied to the context of intertemporal optimization,
entails that the rational expectation equilibrium
is a rational expectation equilibrium path that ex-
tends from the present to the indefinite future.
The arbitrary nature of adaptive expectations
had to be overcome, and the urgency was shared
by many researchers at the time. To get ahead,
Lucas and Prescott (1971) published a paper, “In-
vestment under Uncertainty”, in which they
showed how investment, output, and prices move
over time in a competitive environment under a
stochastic demand while the expected prices are
held to have the same probability distribution as
the actual prices after Muth (1971).
What has come out of the development in the
1960s was a realization that economic agents’ de-
cision making should be modeled as intertempo-
ral optimization and that the expectations, which
are necessary for such optimization, should be
modeled as endogenous expectations formed
from an objective distribution of the market equi-
librium price. Any other theory of expectations
leaves the relationship between formation of ex-
pectations and a distribution of the market equi-
librium price unaccounted for, hence cannot an-
swer the question of whether expectations are
optimal in any meaningful sense. In the light of
such optimality, the theory of rational expecta-
tions fares well, since what is anticipated in terms
of expected prices has the highest objective
chances of being actualized in the market given
stochastic disturbances. At any rate, in retro-
spect, the New Classicism was destined to join
the two ideas : intertemporal optimization on the
one hand and expectations formation on the
other, by way of rational expectations (by inte-
grating the two into market equilibrium that has
an objective distribution). If intertemporal optimi-
zation is the name given to the rationality of deci-
sion making of economic agents, rational expecta-
tions is the name given to the way agents form
their expectations that are equally intertemporal
(since expectations must be formed on all future
prices in order for the market equilibrium to be
attained in the present). The former without the
latter is only a halfway house. That is why Lucas
and Prescott (1971) needed to integrate Muth’s
theory of rational expectations into their model
building. When the idea of intertemporal optimi-
zation was combined with Muth’s concept of ra-
tional expectations, the result was a powerful
way of capturing the way economic agents make
intertemporal decidions with endogenized expec-
tations. Such expectations are allowed to take
into account the probabilities of anticipated fu-
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ture events and their impact on the market equi-
librium prices, which leads to a new insight on
the intimate relationship between decision rules
of rational agents and the environment.
A few more words on expectations are war-
ranted. Before Muth (1961) introduced rational
expectations, we did not have any formal theory
of expectations formation ; the idea of adaptive
expectations was a practical halfway house when
economists were grappling with the information
problem and uncertainty caused by innovations
and other shocks. It assumed that expectations
formed yesterday on the price today (without
telling us how expectations were formed to begin
with) will be corrected by a fraction of the gap be-
tween the two when expectations are extended
into tomorrow. As noted above, this scheme, if
traced recursively into the past, shows that the
expectations for tomorrow will be entirely de-
pendent on the current and the past values of the
prices with distributed lags, which is counter to
the notion of expectations as a foresight. Adap-
tive expectations, therefore, are driven by the
past, hence do not seize the effect of anticipated
events. This is a fatal drawback, for the primary
interest of all rational agents is to steer their ac-
tion plans through the future environment. If we
know beforehand that certain events are likely to
happen in the future and if such events will bear
on rational actions as optimal responses, such
events should be taken into account in the in-
tertemporal planning by appropriate expecta-
tions that are consistent with what is anticipated.
If economic policies affect the probabilities of fu-
ture events and, therefore, the future utilities or
payoffs, expectations should reflect such prob-
abilities, and plans of action should be adjusted in
accordance with how future utilities depend on a
new environment. The theory of rational expec-
tations meets this criterion, by replacing subjec-
tive expectations (whatever expectations individ-
ual agents may form subjectively with what in-
formation they possess) with objective ones (i.e.,
with objective probability distributions of market
equilibrium). This is the insight of Muth’s 1961 pa-
per.［3］It offered a powerful way of combining in-
tertemporal optimization, endogenously formed
expectations in reference to an objective distribu-
tion, and market equilibrium.
Market prices not only make intertemporal
planning possible but also perform a grand task
of coordinating diverse activities of a multitude of
agents with different preferences and technolo-
gies［see Hayek (1945)］. This means that the
state of the economy is represented by a whole
complex of market prices (the prices of final
goods and services, the prices of raw material
and intermediate goods, the prices of factors of
production, etc.). Hence, forecasting future states
of the economy is essentially equivalent to fore-
casting a whole complex of future prices starting
with the present. If intertemporal optimization
requires foreseeing of the future environment in
which agents’ planned actions are to be imple-
mented, and if what this environment offers is
captured by a complex of market prices, then
forming rational expectations, paired with in-
tertemporal optimization, amounts to forming ex-
pectations about all future prices that are likely
to prevail in the market. But, we know that the
future prices will change by what agents plan to
do in the future as well. Hence, forecasting of fu-
ture equilibrium prices must be consistent with
agents’ plans themselves, which requires that the
expected prices be consistent with the equilib-
rium prices that will be realized when agents’ de-
mand and supply plans are implemented as
planned from the present to the indefinite future.
In this maner, if expectations are rationally
formed, the future and the current market prices
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become connected through intertemporal plans.
The future prices are the prices that will prevail
in the future as a consequence of agents’ planned
actions, and the present prices are the prices that
prevail in the current market as a consequence of
agents’ plans extending from the present to the
future. The current market equilibrium prices,
therefore, are not just a consequence of agents’
current actions isolated from what they plan to
do in the future. Thus, rational expectations are
possible only as an expected equilibrium price
path from the present to the future, with all of
agents’ planned actions taken into account. You
can no longer isolate any particular period from
the rest of the periods and talk about agents’ ex-
pectations for that particular period independ-
ently of what is expected to happen in the rest of
the periods. Once the difference is understood
that sets apart adaptive expectations (which are
driven by the past and corrected by what occurs
at present) and rational expectations (which can
only be obtained endogenously from an objective
probability distribution of market equilibrium
prices, conditional on whatever relevant informa-
tion agents may have at the time of forming ex-
pectations including the history of the past obser-
vations and planned policy actions), one should be
able to see why the idea of rational expectations
revolutionized the way we conceive our planned
actions as an optimal path that is consistent with
an equilibrium price path extending from the pre-
sent to the future. If market prices change today,
it is not simply because something happened un-
expectedly today. Even if something unexpected
happens, agents will try to guess what the impli-
cations of such events will be and adjust their op-
timal plans accordingly, which in turn will feed
back to what they do today. Likewise, if what is
expected to happen in the future changes, so do
our planned paths of actions from the present on-
ward. Thus, the idea of rational expectations
changes fundamentally our way of thinking about
the decision making of rational agents ; the mar-
ket price today is an equilibrium phenomenon
that is connected to all future market equilibrium.
The present and the future become intimately
connected through rational expectations.
3. The concept of policy regimes and
econometric policy evaluation
With this understanding of the role of rational
expectations in modeling an economy with in-
tertemporally motivated agents, I return to the
two papers of Lucas : “Econometric Policy Evalu-
ation : A Critique” and “Expectations and the
Neutrality of Money”. In the former paper, Lucas
showed why agents’ decision making cannot be
isolated from policies that will change the future
decision making environment. To make this
point, Lucas starts with Tinbergen’s theory of
economic policy. Jan Tinbergen (the first Nobel
Laureate, who shared the Prize with Ragnar
Frisch in 1969), in his book On the Theory of Eco-
nomic Policy (1952), put forth a theory of eco-
nomic policy, which was based on the idea that
the dynamic movement of the state of an econ-
omy (summarized by a set of state variables), can
be represented by a difference equation, which
describes the state of the economy next period as
a function of three sets of variables : the vari-
ables that comprise the state of the economy this
period, the forcing variables that are assumed to
be exogenous to the system, and error terms. Se-
lecting a workable form of this function and esti-
mating its parameters from the past data, one ob-
tains a first approximation of this dynamic move-
ment, which, because of the presence of error
terms, traces a stochastic sequence over time. Us-
ing this estimated function, we are in a position to
simulate how an economy will move over time for
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a give path of economic policies (as part of the
forcing variables). In order to evaluate this simu-
lated path, we need to define a certain functional
as an evaluative criterion on the three paths : a
stochastic movement of the state of an economy,
a sequence of the forcing variables over time, and
a sequence of error terms. The value of this func-
tional being a random variable, its moments may
be used to discriminate alternative policies for
their effectiveness.
Lucas thought that this seemingly innocuous
way of conducting econometric policy evaluation
is imbued with a fatal defect that cannot be over-
come by technical refinements alone, for the
method itself is counter to the way decisions are
made by intertemporally motivated agents.
Why? An economy evolves with innovations and
fluctuates, and policy making always poses a
challenge. Each business cycle is different. In a
regime in which the policies are rule-based and
fiscal management is disciplined, agents will be
able to make their intertemporal plans with bet-
ter foresight. If agents find themselves in a re-
gime in which policies are discretionary as the
authorities often renege their commitment, they
will be forced to take this into account in their de-
cision making and hedge against the unpredict-
ability of the authorities. Thus, a politico-
economic regime cannot be neutral to the way
agents make their decisions. This implies that if a
regime is altered, the structural parameters of
the behavioral equations must also change. These
parameters, in practice, were estimated from the
past data, but these data reflect a mixture of deci-
sions made under different policy regimes, hence,
in theory, the structural parameters cannot be
uncovered by such estimation. We may presume
that the structural parameters are stable enough
to be relied upon in conducting policy evaluation,
but such evaluation is more a source of problems
than being an indisputable art of policy making.
The reason why the decision modes of agents
cannot be separated from policy regimes is that
agents are intertemporally motivated. Agents
simply do not let the past dictate their decisions
and plans into the future. They make their plans
as the optimal responses to the present and fu-
ture environment defined by an economic policy
regime.
Note that when we talk about an economic re-
gime, we are not simply talking about tax or ex-
penditure policies or monetary policies in sweep-
ing terms. The government certainly prescribes
economic policies of various kinds, but economic
agents also pay attention to how responsive the
government is to problems at hand, how uncer-
tain its commitment is, what type of policies it is
prone to choose, how often and in what way it
surprises the public, and so forth. Economic poli-
cies come, therefore, with a whole set of these
characteristics. Agents’ guesses of the probabili-
ties of a multitude of events and uncertainties dif-
fer from one regime to another, and it is only
natural for agents to take them into account in
their decision making. How to respond to the en-
vironment cannot be captured by a fixed rule
that applies to all possible regimes that come
with different probabilities, uncertainties, and
risks. The essence of the Lucas critique is that
the best decision rules are the ones that take into
account regime-specific features of the environ-
ment.
The meaning of Lucas’s critique can also be
elucidated by dynamic programming, in which an
agent maximizes an objective functional defined
on the space of all possible plans, subject to tran-
sition equations, one for each period, and the in-
itial condition. An optimal plan of actions, called
an optimal path of control variables in this con-
text, is determined sequentially, backwardly
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from the last to the first period. Hence, what an
agent does as part of his optimal plan in any pe-
riod reflects all future transition equations. This
means that if certain policies are planned for any
future period, they will affect the transition equa-
tion of that period, hence all decisions before and
after that period. That is, any change in the fu-
ture environment, reflected in transition equa-
tions, affects an agent’s optimal plan of actions
over the entire planning horizon, not simply the
action of the initial period. The dynamic program-
ming shows that the current and the future deci-
sions, constituting an optimal path of controls, are
all connected. If so, all those policies that change
our regime in the future, so the transition equa-
tions accordingly, will affect what an agent does
in the present even before the regime is actually
altered provided that this change is anticipated.
The concept of the optimality of action plans is a
forward-looking concept, hence how an agent re-
acts to any prospect of future policy changes can-
not be uncovered by looking at how the same
agent reacted to past policy changes. Inciden-
tally, the idea of the dynamic programming and
backward induction makes it possible to conceive
individual agents and the government authorities
as the players of a dynamic game, in which the
latter, knowing how the agents respond to policy
changes, may choose a policy plan designed to
bring about some desirable outcome by manipu-
lating the responses of the agents. The agents, on
the other hand, try to meet the strategy of the
authorities by choosing their best strategies.
Such possibilities of dynamic game playing bring
another element to the argument that the way in-
dividual agents make their decisions cannot be in-
dependent of the policy strategies of the govern-
ment. Individual agents and the government are
the players with different payoff criteria. In such
game playing, there is always a possibility that
the government may change their strategies any
time in the future when a desirable outcome is
achieved. That is, if the government is committed
to a certain strategy for a while and reneges its
commitment later, agents face another complica-
tion of how best to prepare themselves for this
reversal. Such possibilities are the source of time
inconsistency of government policies, and the is-
sue complicates the optimal strategy on the part
of individual agents［see Kydland and Prescott
(1977)］．
To sum up, what Lucas showed in this paper
has changed economists’ way of understanding
and formulating the fundamental tenets of the de-
cision making rules of individual agents. Since
such rules are intertemporally motivated, they
cannot avoid being influenced by a policy regime
(of the decision making environment), in which
many relevant events happen with regime-
specific probabilities, uncertainties, and risks. If
so, it no longer makes sense to assume that the
macroeconomic structures are based on stable
behavioral equations whose parameters are in-
variant to policy regime differences. It is not a co-
incidence that large macroeconometric models
that had been employed for the purpose of policy
evaluation and economic forecasting yielded the
center stage to more process-oriented models
rooted in intertemporal optimization and rational
expectations. Lucas’ critique shifted our attention
away from the structural to the process view,
with a realization that individual agents’ rules of
decision making are joint products of utility maxi-
mization and economic policies. Sargent ex-
presses, in the paper cited above, how stunned
macroeconomists were to read Lucas’s 1976 pa-
per.
It took us longer than we like to recall to
understand how thoroughly the idea of ra-
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tional expectations would cause us to change
the way we did macroeconomics. Neil Wal-
lance and I had already written several pa-
pers about rational expectations in 1969-
1972, and had read drafts of Lucas’s JET pa-
per as well as two key papers by Lucas and
Prescott. But we didn’t understand what was
going on until, upon reading Lucas’s ’Econo-
metric Policy Evaluation : A Critique’ in
Spring of 1973, we were stunned into termi-
nating our long standing Minneapolis Fed re-
search project to design, estimate, and opti-
mally control a Keynesian macroeconometric
model. We realized then that Kareken,
Muench, and Wallance’s (1973) defense of the
‘look-at-everything’ feedback rule for mone-
tary policy which was thoroughly based on
‘best responses’ for the monetary authority
exploiting a ‘no response’ private sector-
could not be the foundation of a sensible re-
search program, but was better viewed as a
memorial plaque to the Keynesian tradition
in which we had been trained to work.
Sargent (1995), p. 539.
4. Expectations and the neutrality of
money : rational expectations equilib-
rium theory
Lucas wrote another stunning paper, “Expecta-
tions and the Neutrality of Money,” which
changed the course of development of macro-
economic theory and research ever since. The
central question addressed in this paper was :
How can money be nonneutral when changes in
the supply of money are unanticipated (or in the
short-run) while it is neutral when such changes
are anticipated (or in the long-run), within the tra-
dition of the quantity theory of money. Or, in
terms of a possible relationship between inflation
and the unemployment rate, how is it possible to
obtain a downward-sloped Phillips curve empiri-
cally, when there is in fact no real tradeoff be-
tween the two. The quantity theory of money
dates back to Nicolaus Copernicus (1526), Martin
de Azpilcueta (Salamanca School), Jean Boden
(1568), David Hume (1952), and John Stuart Mill
(1848), among others, and was elaborated by Irv-
ing Fisher (1911) . The crux of the theory is that if
the quantity of money is doubled, the prices of all
goods double, with no change in real output, since
the relative prices, determined by demand and
supply, remain unchanged. Hence, the theory as-
serts that money is neutral to real output. In this
sense, money is a veil. But, Hume and others
were aware that depending on the way the quan-
tity of money is increased, money can have real
effects before it regains its neutrality. Lucas, in
his Nobel memorial lecture (1995, pp. 246-247),
goes back to Hume’s conception on the neutrality
of money, quoting from Hume’s essays of 1952, Of
Money and Of Interest. Let me reproduce below
what Lucas quotes from these essays ; the first
two quotes are on the neutrality of money, and
the third guote is on possible short-run effects of
money on employment and production. These
quotes show that what Lucas attempted to ac-
complish in his paper on expectations and the
neutrality of money is to address essentially the
same questions, with an advantage of a mathe-
matically formulated model that can answer
many of the questions that were left unanswered
in Hume’s essays. Lucas quotes :
It is indeed evident that money is nothing
but the representation of labour and com-
modities, and serves only as a method of rat-
ing or estimating them. Where coin is in
greater plenty, as a greater quantity of it is
required to represent the same quantity of
goods, it can have no effect, either good or
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bad ... any more than it would make an al-
teration on a merchant’s books, if, instead of
the Arabian method of notation, which re-
quires few characters, he should make use of
the Roman, which requires a great many. (Of
Money, p. 28)
Were all the gold in England annihilated at
once, and one and twenty shillings substi-
tuted in place of every guinea, would money
be more plentiful or interest lower? No
surely : We should only use silver instead of
gold. Were gold rendered as common as sil-
ver, and, and silver as common as copper,
would money be more plentiful or interest
lower? We may assuredly give the same an-
swer. Our shillings would then be yellow,
and our halfpence white, and we should have
no guineas. No other difference would ever
be observed, no alteration on commerce,
manufactures, navigation, or interest, unless
we imagine that the color of money is of any
consequence. (Of Interest, p. 47)
When any quantity of money is imported
into a nation, it is not at first dispersed into
many hands but is confined to the coffers of a
few persons, who immediately seek to em-
ploy it to advantage. Here are a set of manu-
facturers or merchants, we shall suppose,
who have received returns of gold and silver
for goods they have sent to Cadiz. They are
thereby enabled to employ more workmen
than formerly, who never dream of demand-
ing higher wages, but are glad of employ-
ment from such good paymasters.［The arti-
san］... carries his money to the market,
where he finds every thing at the same price
as formerly, but returns with greater quan-
tity and of better kinds for the use of his fam-
ily. The farmer and gardener, finding that all
their commodities are taken off, apply them-
selves with alacrity to raising more... It is
easy to trace the money in its progress
through the whole commonwealth, where
we shall find that it must first quicken the
diligence of every individual before it in-
creases the price of labor. (Of Money, p. 38)
There is always an interval before matters
be adjusted to their new situations, and this
interval is as pernicious to industry when
gold and silver are diminishing as it is advan-
tageous when these metals are increasing.
The workman has not the same employment
from the manufacturer or merchant though
he pays the same price for everything in the
market. The farmer cannot dispose of his
corn and cattle, though he must pay the
same rent to his landlord. The poverty, and
beggary, and sloth which must ensue are
easily foreseen. (Of Money, p. 40)
Immediately after these quotes, Lucas asks
specific questions that need to be answered.
These indicate what the central issues are when
the neutrality or the nonneutrality of money is
addressed. It is useful to review them. He writes :
Humes makes it clear that he does not
view his opinions about the initial effects of
monetary expansions as major qualifications
to the quantity theory, to his view that “it is
of no manner of consequence, with regard to
the domestic happiness of a state, whether
money be in a greater or less quantity.” Per-
haps he simply did not see that the irrele-
vance of units changes from which he de-
duces the long run neutrality of money has
similer implications for the initial reaction to
money changes as well. Why, for example,
does an early recipient of the new money
“find every thing at the same price as for-
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merly.” If everyone understands that prices
will ultimately increase in proportion to the
increase in money, what force stops this
from happening right away? Are people
committed, perhaps even contractually, to
continue to offer goods at the old prices for a
time? If so, Hume does not mention it. Are
seller ignorant of the fact that money has in-
creased and a general inflation is inevitable?
But Hume claims that the real consequences
of money changes are “easy to trace” and
“easily foreseen.” If so, why do these conse-
quences occur at all?
These questions do not involve mere mat-
ters of detail. Hume has deduced the quan-
tity theory of money by purely theoretical
reasoning from “that principle of reason” that
people act rationally and that this fact is re-
flected in market-determined quantities and
prices. Consistency surely requires at least
an attempt to apply these same principles to
the analysis of the initial effects of a mone-
tary expansion or contraction. I think the
fact is that this is just too difficult a problem
for an economist equipped with only verbal
methods, even someone of Hume’s remark-
able powers.
Lucas (1995, pp. 247-249)
Having reviewed how Lucas’s paper goes back
to Hume’s conception of the neutrality of money,
let me come back to the 1960s and the 1970s, in
which the Keynesians and the monetarists were
engaged in heated debate over the effect of
money (or nominal demand) on output. We know
that the central banks in developed countries
these days control the supply of money with the
intent of stabilizing the economy. In the 1960s
and 1970s, the issue of the real effects of money
was controversial. How can a change in nominal
demand, through a mere increase in the supply of
money, affect employment and production?
Keynesians, following the Hicks IS-LM paradigm
(Hicks 1937), divided the economy into two sec-
tors : the real sector involving consumption, sav-
ing, and investment decisions, and the monetary-
financial sector involving portfolio decisions.
Three conceptual elements constitute their the-
ory : the marginal propensity to consume, the
marginal efficiency of investment, and the liquid-
ity preferences. According to this theory, in a
nutshell, an increase in the supply of money first
lowers the interest rate as an excess supply of
money is used to acquire bonds, causing their
prices to rise and their interest rates to fall,
which, in turn, increases investment to the point
where the marginal efficiency of investment
matches the interest rate. The effect of invest-
ment on production is then amplified by the mul-
tiplier process, which is dampened as the rise in
income feeds back on the market interest rate by
raising the demand for money. Money is, there-
fore, nonneutral to employment and production.
But, the monetarists of the day, whose theories
were based on the quantity theory of money,
were trying to develop a theory that can show
that money can have real effects in the short-run
while their long-held position on the neutrality of
money in the long-run is not compromised. Milton
Friedman was the leading figure of the monetar-
ist camp. Reviving the age-old quantity theory of
money and placing it under the new light of theo-
retical and empirical monetarism, he regarded
agents as maximizers of utility from owning of
wealth, hence proposed a theory of the demand
for money by treating money as only one kind of
many assets, that is, as only one way of holding
wealth for wealth-owing agents. He also viewed
money as one kind of capital for productive enter-
prises. For wealth-owning units, the demand for
16
money cannot be separated from consumption
and saving demand, nor from the demand for du-
rable goods and human capital, nor from the de-
mand for other financial instruments such as
bonds and equities ; and for business firms, it is
not separate from the demand for capital. Thus,
the demand for money is a function of the returns
on all alternatives to holding money. In such the-
ory, any excess money supply will be used not
only to purchase various assets (money, bonds,
and equities) but also to buy physical goods (con-
sumption goods as well as durable goods). Pro-
duction is thus affected more directly, but the
multiplier effect will be of a limited size since con-
sumption, as part of the considerations that enter
into the demand for money, is determined, ac-
cording to Friedman, by permanent income
rather than by current income. As the prices of
assets and durable goods rise, their rates of re-
turn fall, even the rate of return from holding du-
rable goods (which is measured by the marginal
efficiency of investment in Keynesian terms).
Thus, in Friedman’s theory, an increase in the
quantity of money supply will spread over all fi-
nancial and real assets (including durable goods
and human capital) and reduce their rates of re-
turn over the board. In his theory, an increase in
money supply causes the demand for durable
goods (as part of the demand for all assets) to rise
directly rather than reducing the interest rate to
fall in the financial market first and then increas-
ing the demand for investment, with a conse-
quent fall in the marginal efficiency of invest-
ment.
Friedman did not dichotomize the economy
into the real sector and the monetary-financial
sector as in the Hicks IS-LM paradigm. With the
stability of the market system and with the sta-
bility of the demand for money, which is based on
how wealth is conceived in the long-run, short-
run changes in the money supply can certainly
cause the economy to flutter in terms of real out-
put, but such changes dissipate in the long-run
when the rates of return on all assets are ad-
justed. If money supply is increased on a perpet-
ual basis, it will lead to higher inflation (with pos-
sible adverse effects on the economy to the ex-
tent the future is made more uncertain) ; if in-
creases in money supply are fully anticipated
with no added uncertainty into the future, there
will be no real effects of money in the long-run,
where the real forces of the economy determine
the equilibrium although such equilibrium is not
as ideal as the Walrasian equilibrium). Friedman’s
monetarism does not stand by itself, since it is re-
lated to his theory of the natural rate of unem-
ployment. If an increase in the quantity of money
supply is to have some positive effect on employ-
ment and output, the equilibrium in the labor
market requires that real wages the firms pay be
made lower while expected real wages the work-
ers anticipate be made higher. But, such condi-
tions cannot be met unless the price level is al-
lowed to change. If the price level changes by an
increase in money supply, and if a gap is created
between the actual inflation (which determines
the real wage offer by firms) and the expected in-
flation (which determines the expected real wage
conceived by workers), then there will be a tem-
porary increase in employment and output. Such
an increase is short-lived as the expected inflation
catches up with the actual inflation. The unem-
ployment rate and production, therefore, return
to their natural levels. Such was Friedman’s the-
ory of the Phillips curve. Whatever may be the
changes that are caused by an increase in money
supply in employment and output (which is possi-
ble under Friedman’s expanded theory of the de-
mand for money), they will be nullified in the
long-run as the equilibrium of the economy is re-
17HAYAKAWA : Lucas’ Contributions to the Economic Sciences from a Historical Perspective
stored at the natural rate of unemployment.
Before leaving this debate between the
Keynesians and the monetarists, it is useful to re-
view the quantity theory of money. This theory
has been expressed in different forms. The trans-
actions version［Fisher (1911)］, which became
popular, is expressed as follows :
(a)
where P is a suitably chosen average price ; T is
a suitably chosen aggregate quantity per unit
time ; M is the stock of money ; V is the velocity
of circulation of money (the number of turnovers
per unit time). The right side PT measures the
total nominal value of the payments per unit
time, and the left side MV measures the total
nominal value of the turnovers per unit (how
many times the stock of money turned over per
unit time). This equation is also written in the in-
come form.
(b)
where P is the implicit GDP deflator (the price in-
dex implicit in estimating GDP at constant
prices ; y is real GDP (GDP at constant prices).
Py, therefore, is nominal GDP. The left side meas-
ures the nominal value of the stock of money
turned over V times. While the transactions ver-
sion includes all transactions involving intermedi-
ate goods and existing financial and real assets,
such transactions are excluded from the income
version. Also, while the transactions version fo-
cuses on money transferred from one hand to an-
other in transactions, the income version focuses
on money held by agents as a whole.
The quantity theory of money has also taken a
form after the Cambridge cash-balance approach,
which emphasizes money as an abode of the pur-
chasing power held in between sale and purchase
of goods and services. This approach, therefore,
writes how much agents (households and firms)
desire to hold of such purchasing power as
(c)
Written this way, k stands for the ratio of the
stock of money to nominal GDP. This k can be in-
terpreted either as the ratio that is calculated
from nominal income and the stock of money, so
that (c) holds as an identity, or as the desired ra-
tio, in which case M is the stock of money that
agents desire to hold. If form (c) is compared with
(b), it is seen that , where if k denotes the
desired ratio, V must denote the desired velocity
(how many times agents want to turn over their
money stock). See Friedman (1970, pp. 195-202)
for the difference between the transactions ap-
proach and the cash-balance approach.
Now, Friedman lists a number of factors that
affect the demand for money by wealth holders :
(1) total wealth, divided into various forms of as-
sets, where income as a surrogate of this wealth
is better served by the concept of permanent in-
come because it is, by definition, the interest re-
turn on wealth, (2) the division of wealth between
human and nonhuman forms, where the fraction
of total wealth in the form of nonhuman wealth
can be an important determinant, (3) the ex-
pected rates of return on money and other assets
(interest rates on bonds, dividends on equities,
storage costs on physical capital, and changes in
their nominal prices due to inflation or deflation),
and (4) other variables that determine the utility
of the services that money renders, i.e., the utility
value of the liquidity that money provides. With
these factors taken into account, Friedman (1970)
writes the demand for money by an individual
wealth holder as
, (d)
where stands for the money stock in real
terms ; y is real income ; w is the fraction of
wealth in non-human form ; is the expected
nominal rate of return of money ; is the ex-
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pected nominal rate of return of fixed-value secu-
rities (including expected changes in their
prices) ; ( ) ( ) is t he expected rate of
change of prices of goods (hence, the expected
nominal rate of return of real assets) ; is a port-
manteau symbol for all other variables that affect
the utility services of money［Friedman (1970, pp.
202-205)］．The money demanded by business en-
terprises is affected by another set of factors.
While some are shared by the money demanded
by individual wealth holders, others are specific
to enterprises. Rather than wealth, some scale
factor reflecting the productive value of different
quantities of money may be important for enter-
prises, although data on such a factor are difficult
to obtain ; the division of wealth between human
and nonhuman wealth is of little relevance for en-
terprises ; rates of return on money and alterna-
tive assets, particularly the interest rates on bank
loans, are important ; the portmanteau term u in-
cludes all other variables other than the scale fac-
tor but including expectations about the eco-
nomic stability. With such modifications, the de-
mand function (d) with w excluded may be
viewed as representing the demand for enter-
prises［Friedman (1970), pp. 205-206)］．When the
two demand functions are aggregated, we obtain
the aggregate demand for money.
Notice that if the demand for money is ex-
pressed in nominal terms as
, (e)
and if this function is homogenous of the first de-
gree in P and Y (that is, doubling of the average
price and nominal income implies that nominal
demand for money doubles), then it holds that
.
(f)
Taking , this gives
, (g)
where is subsumed. This is essentially
the real demand for money specified in (d). Now,
take , and this gives
(h)
With the right side written as , (h) gives
(i)
Write (i) as
(j)
where in g(.) is replaced by in (.) ; that is,
. (k)
This shows that writing the real demand for
money as in (g) is essentially identical to writing
the income velocity of circulation as depending
on the same variables. Friedman held that the de-
mand for money function is stable because it is
part of long-run considerations focused on wealth.
This stability then translates into the stability of
the income velocity of circulation. The stability of
the demand for money implies that any excess
money supply will affect the demand for all as-
sets (not only the demand for financial assets but
also physical goods), hence production of goods.
All of the variables that enter into the demand
for money are endogenously determined in the
asset market, although how expectations are
formed with respect to market equilibrium re-
mained unsettled in his theory despite the fact
that expectations play a vitally important role in
the demand behavior of wealth-owners and en-
terprises.
The quantity theory of money is based on the
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idea that elementary events in the economy are
transactions. If all transactions are recorded as
payments and receipts, we should be able to get
the nominal value of all transactions. If money
changes hands in such transactions, the question
is how many times money changes hands per
unit time interval, which gives the velocity of cir-
culation. Whether this is expressed in terms of
transactions or income, the idea is the same, al-
though, in the case of income, we are focused on
how many times money changes hands in trans-
actions involving only final goods rather than all
goods (final and intermediate) and assets (physi-
cal and financial).
On top of this function of money as a medium
of exchange, money performs another function,
as a store of value. Money serves as a contrivance
like a social security, that makes it possible for
agents to carry their savings stored as money
from their productive years to the future when
they are no longer working. The idea of money as
a store of value was already recognized by Aris-
totle in Nicomachean Ethics (Book V, 1133 b).
Samuelson (1958) wrote an influential paper on
how the overlapped generations of the young and
the old can trade to get an optimal lifetime con-
sumption when goods produced are perishables.
The young produce goods, part of which are sold
to the old in exchange for the money they hold,
and money acquired is taken to the future, when
this money is used to buy goods produced by the
young then. In this paper, Samuelson showed
that if money is introduced, the non-optimal
negative-interest-rate configuration (of a free
market) can be restored to the optimal biological-
interest-rate configuration, without requiring any
social security scheme or any other social com-
pact. Thus, money serves as a contrivance that
brings about the socially optimum configuration
in a free market. It goes without saying that
money serves as a store of value because it is ac-
cepted as a medium of exchange. Lucas, in his pa-
per on expectations and the neutrality of money,
modeled a monetary economy inhabited by the
overlapped generations of the young and the old
after Samuelson’s paper.
Lucas, in the same paper, also analyzes a fixed
growth rate rule of money supply called the k-
percent rule, which was proposed by Milton
Friedman (1959, 1962). Friedman, with Anna
Schwartz, did an extensive analysis of the mone-
tary history of the United States, which culmi-
nated in a magnificent piece of work, A Monetary
History of the United States, 1867-1960. In this
work, they examined how monetary expansion or
contraction was related to economic expansion or
contraction, and looked into the historical cases of
the misguided monetary policies. See, in particu-
lar, chapter 7 of the book titled The Great Con-
traction, for an episode. With such a track record
of the policies of the Federal Reserve in hand,
Friedman advocated that money supply be
guided by a fixed rule that is consistent with the
growth rate of an economy. Whether the Fed’s
policy should be guided by a fixed rule or a dis-
cretionary policy is a matter of great contro-
versy, but the fact remains that Friedman’s k-
percent rule was the first serious suggestion of a
fixed rule. There has been a burgeoning litera-
ture on monetary policy rules, particularly after
1990s. John Taylor (1993) introduced what has
come to be known as the Taylor rule ; Hender-
son and McKibbin (1993) also introduced a similar
one. The Taylor rule is a feedback rule on the in-
terest rate, which requires that the interest rate
be adjusted, partly by a fraction of the deviation
of the inflation from the target level and partly by
a fraction of the deviation of real GDP from its
trend level. In the United States, the Federal
Open Market Committee, through open market
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operations, adjusts the federal funds rate. Taylor,
having observed the Fed’s actions for several
years, noted that they can be approximated by
the rule
(l)
where is the federal funds rate (the interest
rate that banks charge each other for overnight
loans to meet the reserve requirement) ; is the
target inflation rate ; is the percentage devia-
tion of real GDP from its trend ; is the steady
state equilibrium real federal funds rate. Taylor
sets and . Under this rule, if the infla-
tion rate deviates one percent from the desired
rate, the federal funds rate should be set higher
by of this deviation ; if the real GDP deviates
from the potential GDP by one percent, again the
federal funds rate should be set higher by of
the deviation. With such adjustment, the Fed
tries to keep the economy growing along the long-
run trend (the steady state growth path) and to
keep the inflation running closely to the target
rate. The Taylor rule may not be completely rule-
based, since how much the policy interest rate
should be adjusted and also when to do so are still
left to the discretion of the monetary authorities.
We need to keep in mind that the Taylor rule is
not something derived from optimality considera-
tions. Friedman’s rule, on the other hand, does
not leave much room for discretion. Lucas took
this rule and showed that there does not exist
any other feasible allocation that is Pareto-
superior to the one under the rule. See Taylor
(1998) for a history of monetary policy rules.
In summary, at the time Lucas wrote his 1972
paper, many questions were at large. Some of
these questions were : (1) how to incorporate ra-
tional expectations into intertemporal equilib-
rium models in order to endogenize expectations
in intertemporal equilibrium models ; (2) how to
analyze the neutrality or the nonneutrality of
money from the perspective of the quantity the-
ory of money ; (3) how to model intertemporally
motivated agents and relate their real decisions
(production, consumption, saving, investment,
etc.) to their decisions on asset holdings (in par-
ticular, how to integrate the demand for money
with the demand for consumption and saving) ;
(4) how to model a monetary economy in which
monetary disturbances and real disturbances (in-
novations of all kinds) coexist, and in which a Phil-
lips curve type relation may be observed be-
tween the unemployment rate and the rate of in-
flation ; and (5) how to evaluate monetary policies
including Friedman’s k-percent rule.
Lucas attempted to answer these questions by
constructing a parable economy in which agents,
observing equilibrium market prices, cannot
separate monetary from real disturbances. The
model is based on the idea that while the general
equilibrium of the economy is determined by
relative prices, the absolute price level depends
on the quantity of money supplied. If no real inno-
vations occur, we would expect that the greater
is the quantity of money supplied, the higher are
the prices in the market, but with no change in
relative prices, hence with no change in the equi-
librium of the economy. This is the neutrality
proposition of the quantity theory of money. But,
with real shocks, the relative prices of goods will
be changed under a fixed supply of money, hence
the equilibrium is affected. If monetary distur-
bances are added, agents, who are observing
market prices, will not be able to separate rela-
tive price changes from absolute price changes. If
so, agents will be forced to hedge against the pos-
sibility that the market price changes may have
been caused by real shocks. Such hedging will re-
sult in producing more as market prices rise,
since agents can now exchange the goods they
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produce with more money to be taken to future
periods. If agents know that money supply is
fixed or grows at a fixed rate, then any change in
market prices can be attributed to real shocks. If
agents observe the market prices alone and infor-
mation on the amount of money supplied follows
with a time lag, then they will not be able to iso-
late real from nominal shocks while they are
making decisions in the short-run, hence will be
forced to hedge against the case that price rises
are due to real shocks. This is basically the story
of the Lucas’s parable model. Note again that, in
constructing his model, Lucas integrated deci-
sions on the demand for money with decisions on
production, consumption, and saving, and allowed
the equilibrium in the money market to emerge
with the equilibrium in the goods market. His
model, in this sense, is very much in accord with
Friedman’s insight that monetary and real deci-
sions cannot be separated.
5. Lucas’s model of a monetary economy
Let me show in more detail how Lucas con-
structed his equilibrium model. To model how
hedging can occur through the confounding of
market equilibrium prices in relative and abso-
lute terms, Lucas constructed a model of a mone-
tary economy which is inhabited by two overlap-
ping generations in each period, the young and
the old. Money is a fiat money issued by the gov-
ernment, and serves as a contrivance to carry
one’s saving into future when goods produced are
all perishables.
The story goes like this : In each period, a new
generation is born and lives for two periods.
There are N individuals in each generation.
Hence, two generations of the same size coexist
in each period. The young work and the old do
not. The young do not have money but the old
have. The young consume a portion of what they
produce and sell the rest to the old in exchange
for the money they have, and carry this money
into their second period when they no longer
work. The old only consume, buying some of the
goods that the young produce, with the money
they acquired when they were young. In per-
capita terms, the young decide on how much to
work (denoted n), consume (denoted c), and save
(denoted s). What the young save is purchased by
the old, exchanged with the money they have.
The amount of money that the young desire to
carry to their second period (denoted ), must
equal to the saving s, so that the demand for
money by the young and their saving are tied by
where is the market price of the goods in
the first period (this is an important insight that
follows Friedman’s theory of the demand for
money ; namely, the decisions on demand for
money and the decisions on saving and consump-
tion are derived from the same optimization deci-
sions). The young take this money to their second
period and spend it in exchange for consumption
goods produced by the young then under the pre-
vailing market price (denoted ).
The young generation is divided randomly into
two groups, one group sent to Island 1 and the
other to Island 2 ; and are the fractions
of this generation going to Island 1 and Island 2,
respectively, where is a random variable de-
fined on the domain (0, 2). The stock of money
that the old generation has per capita at the be-
ginning of each period is given by , so that the
total stock of money that the old have as a whole
amounts to . One half of the old generation
goes to Island 1 and the other half goes to Island
2, so that the total stock of money in each island
at the beginning of each period equals . The
demand for money by the young is determined
by the equi-marginal principle that the marginal
utility of acquiring a dollar in terms of the for-
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gone utility of consumption in the first period is
balanced with the expected marginal utility of
this money in terms of the utility of consumption
in the next period.
In Lucas’ model, there are two types of shocks.
One is shocks in the form of a randomly selected
distribution of the newly born generation (the
young generation) between the two islands, cap-
tured by , and the other is nominal shocks in the
form of a randomly selected gross rate of money
supply, x for the first period and for the sec-
ond ; since they are the gross rates, they can be
written as and , respectively. At the be-
ginning of each period, the nominal stock of
money that the old possess per-capita is assumed
known (that is, m is known), but, the intra-period
amount of money (how much money there is ac-
tually in each period in the market) is not known
perfectly because m is changed randomly by x
during the period and this x is not announced at
the beginning of the period. This quantity can
only be guessed by observing market equilibrium
prices. Unrealistic as Lucas’ model may appear at
first sight, it does capture the essence of a real
economy, in whichi agents are producing in their
own industries under concurrent real shocks. As
profit maximizers, they are guided by relative
prices determined by the demand and the supply,
but the quantity of money the central bank sup-
plies determines the general price level across
the industries. Hence, the prices in the industries
reflect both the quantity of money supplied by
the central bank and real shocks that are occur-
ring in them (that is, real changes in the demand
and the supply). When producing agents in their
industries find their prices rising, they may not
be able to tell immediately whether such changes
are relative price changes (relative to the prices
of other industries) or overall price changes
caused by an increase in money supply. When
relative prices of the goods produced in specific
industries rise, profit maximization requires that
more be produced, but if all prices change more
or less proportionately across all industries, there
should be no change in the quantity to be pro-
duced in each industry. Thus, Lucas’ model, as a
fable, captures the confounded nature of market
equilibrium prices in a monetary economy (con-
founding of relative and absolute prices) ; the for-
mer are caused either by supply shocks (techno-
logical innovations) or by demand shocks and the
latter by the supply of money by the central
bank.
Lucas formulates the decisions of a newly born
agent as an intertemporal optimization problem
over two periods. In his first period, the agent
works n hours, each hour producing one unit of
output. The total output (n) is partially consumed
(c) and partially saved (s). The saving is ex-
changed with money that the old have under
price p, so that the demand for money ( ) by the
young is equated to their saving by . The
young, when they get old, consume . The objec-
tive functional (the utility functional) is, therefore,
defined on path , which is, by assumption,
broken down to two separate utilities ; one is the
utility that depends on consumption and labor in
the first period, denoted U , and the other is
the expected utility from consumption in the sec-
ond period, denoted (where E stands for
the expected value). Since equals the amount
of consumption that the young can get with their
money balances in the second period, it must hold
that . Varibles and are random
variables, but the young knows the stock of
money m at the beginning of the first period and
can observe the market price p in the same pe-
riod. Hence, what we need in order to compute
EV is a probability distribution conditional on
and p. Let this conditional probability distribu-
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tion be written as F (a conditional cu-
mulative joint probability distribution). With this
distribution, EV is calculated as
(1)
where integration is over the domain on which
and are defined.
Lucas assumes that both current consumption
c and leisure l are not inferior goods, so that, in
reference to Fig. 1 below, the price-consumption
line in the c-n space is downward-sloped ; that is,
as the budget line shifts upward, consumption in-
creases and labor declines (or leisure increases).
(2)［4］
It is also assumed that the utility function
is increasing, strictly concave, and twice continu-
ously differentiable, with the properties :
(3)
Also, is increasing. That is,
(4)
And the elasticity of with respect to
is assumed to be bounded away from zero. That
is,
(5)
These assumptions are invoked to prove the exis-
tence of the rational expectations equilibrium
price function with certain features.
With this setup, a newly born agent’s optimiza-
tion problem is to choose c, n, and to maximize
his functional subject to the budget constraint :
where is the demand for money
that the young agent wants to carry to his second
period.
(6)
subject to :
Write the Lagrangian as
. (7)
Under the assumption that the distribution
is such that the objective functional
is continuously differentiable, we may write the
Kuhn-Tucker conditions as both necessary and
sufficient conditions for this maximization prob-
lem.
(8)
(9)
(10)
with equality if .
Let it be assumed that all choice decisions are
interior (i.e., , , and ), so that the
above Kuhn-Tucker conditions hold with equal-
ity.
(11)
(12)
(13)
. (14)
First, (11) and (12), we have
. With from (14) substituted
into this, we may solve for as a function of ,
i.e., . With substituted into ,
can also be solved as a function of , i.e.,
. With and substituted into
(11), can be written as a function of , that is,
, where is the
expected marginal utility of a dollar taken to the
next period ; , therefore, stands for the mar-
ginal utility by money worth one unit of con-
sumption this period. , , and
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cn
the income-consumption line
O
( / p)0
( / p)
1
( / p)
2
n ( / p)0( )
c ( / p)0( )
c =  / p + n
the budget lines corresponding 
to different levels of
 / p
imply that for each level of (the amount of
money to be taken to the next period), there cor-
respond the optimal levels of consumption and la-
bor, and the marginal utility of consumption. We
see that is positive, increasing (since an in-
crease in implies a greater and less ), and
continuously differentiable and that , taking
a finite value, gives the marginal utility of con-
sumption at the optimal point on the budget line
with no money taken to the second period ; see
Fig. 1 above.
The fact that and can be expressed as func-
tions of can be shown graphically. In Fig. 1, in
the labor-consumption space, the budget line (9) :
is drawn with the intercept
and the slope 1, along with several indifference
curves. By the assumption that consumption and
leisure are not inferior goods, it is seen that as the
budget line shifts upward (i.e., as the demand for
money balances declines so that the young agent
has more to spend on consumption and leisure in
the first period), the optimal choice moves along
the income-consumption line in the north-west di-
rection. Likewise, as the agent wants to carry
more money into the second period, labor in-
creases and consumption declines in the first pe-
riod.
Since is written as (the marginal util-
Figure 1
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ity of consumption), (13) can be expressed as
, (15)
or
. (16)
In (15), the left side, which is , represents the
marginal cost of acquiring a dollar in terms of the
forgone utility of consumption this period, and
the right side the marginal benefit of acquiring a
dollar this period in terms of its expected (mar-
ginal) utility next period. Alternatively, in (16) the
left side represents the marginal cost of saving
one unit of consumption this period, and the right
side the expected (marginal) utility of consump-
tion that this saving will afford next period. Con-
dition (15) or (16) is, therefore, the equi-marginal
principle holding between consumption today
and money balances to be obtained today.
The total stock of money equals at the
beginning of the period in each island, but it will
be changed to during the period, where
is the rate of change of money supply in gross
terms (for instance, if , it means that
money supply is increased by ). The number of
the young agents in Island 1 is given by .
Hence, the amount of money per capita equals
divided by , which gives . If
takes a large number, this per capita stock will be
large for any given . If, on the other hand,
takes a small value for any given , the per capita
stock of money will be large. That is, if the money
supply is increased, or if the fraction of N that
goes to Island 1 decreases, there is more money
per capita in that island.
Now the quantity theory plays its role in Lucas’
model. If the quantity of money per capita goes
up, the prices are bound to rise. So, it is reason-
able to guess, by the insight of this theory, that
the prices in Island 1 will rise with an increase in
the per capita stock of money. But, how much the
prices go up with an increase in money supply
also depends on the demand for money, which is
derived from how much the young want to save
for consumption next period. And, this demand
depends on what the prices will be next period.
With this considered, the equilibrium condition of
money demand and money supply is written as
, (17)
where the amount demanded is determined by
the condition that the marginal cost of acquiring
a dollar in terms of foregone (marginal) utility of
consumption equals the marginal benefit of ac-
quiring a dollar in terms of the expected (mar-
ginal) utility that it will bring next period. That is,
(18)
where (the marginal
utility of consumption when consumption and la-
bor are optimally chosen as functions of real bal-
ances to be carried into the next period, which is
and is the marginal utility of con-
sumption when consumption is done at the level
(where is the amount of money to be car-
ried to the next period, is the growth rate of
money supply in the next period, and is the
price level of the same period). In reference to
Fig. 1, is the marginal utility of consump-
tion at the point of tangency between the budget
line of and the indifference curve tangent to
it. is a conditional joint probability
distribution (a cumulative joint probability distri-
bution of and conditional on the per capita
stock of money known at the beginning of the pe-
riod and on the prices that are observed in the
market). One dollar acquired this period sacri-
fices units of consumption, hence
stands for how much utility the young agent is
giving up in order to acquire a dollar. If he takes
this dollar into the second period, it will buy con-
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sumption by the amount of , hence the mar-
ginal utility in the second period of a dollar saved
in the first period can be calculated as the ex-
pected value of where this ex-
pectation is taken with respect to the joint distri-
bution . This distribution cannot be
something that is exogenously given. So, the
question is how it is determined endogenously.
This question is answered by analyzing the mar-
ket equilibrium price.
The demand for money in per-capita terms is
determined by the equi-marginal principle (18),
and the per-capital stock of money in Island 1 is
given by . The equilibrium between the two,
therefore, was written as (see (17)). Sub-
stituting this condition into (18) gives
.
(19)
This is the equi-marginal principle holding when
the demand for money is equal to the supply of
money in the market.
Turning to the question of how and are
related, we need to consider how is determined
at market equilibrium. Going back to the quantity
theory of money, since the per-capita stock of
money is given by , it would be reasonable
to assume that the prices are determined by
, or, more generally, by , , and . So ,we
may write this relationship as a function
. (20)
Because , , and are the state of the economy
in Island 1, the price function (20) is defined on
this state. The idea that the market equilibrium
price can perhaps be given as a function of the
state of the economy is innovative. As and are
random variables, so is the market equilibrium
price written this way. This is an objective rela-
tion with an objective distribution of and .
Now, the market equilibrium price in the sec-
ond period should also be determined in the same
way, i.e., by the same function under the state of
the second period. That is,
. (21)
Again, this is an objective functional relation with
an objective distribution of , , and , condi-
tional on the price observed this period, which is
given by , a nd m, which is known at the
beginning of the first period. Hence, with the ob-
served m being subsumed, this conditional objec-
tive distribution can be written as
. (22)
With this objective conditional distribution
replacing , and
with (20) and (21) utilized, the market equilibrium
condition (19) transforms to :
(23)
If a solution to and is found
that satisfies (23), this solution should give us the
rational expectations equilibrium function.
Note how the idea of rational expectations is in-
voked here. This is done, first by assuming that
the price is determined by an objective price
function of the state of the economy
, and second by replacing
with an objective distribution function
. That is, the probability
distribution of the objective price function
is extended to the probability dis-
tribution of the expected price function,
, which is assumed to be of the
same form as , and a probability dis-
tribution , conditional on m and p, is
replaced with an objective probability distribu-
tion , conditional on m and
. We may call such expectations the ra-
tional expectations in the strong sense, as op-
posed to rational expectations in the week sense
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in which expectations are identified with the
mathematical expected value, rather than with
the entire distribution of a random variable.
With the rational expectations equilibrium
function, the per-capita stock of real balances (the
per-capita stock of money divided by the price
level) will take a finite value bounded between
zero and infinity (both zero and infinity are not al-
lowed). We know that the per-capita stock of
money in Island 1 is given by . If this quan-
tity is divided by the price , it de fines the per-
capita stock of real balances, . The quantity
theory of money suggests that the equilibrium
price in the first period is determined by .
Hence, the solution of , under rational
expectations, is expected to take a general form
.
Formally, an equilibrium price function is de-
fined as a continuous and nonnegative function
of ( ) which satisfies the equi-marginal
principle at equilibrium, (20), such that the per-
capita stock of real balances takes a positive fi-
nite value (i.e., ). This is a
rational expectations equilibrium price function.
One particular form of this solution that Lucas
considers is
, (24)
where is expected to be an increasing
function of (as increases, so do the per-
capita stock of money and the price ). If the solu-
tion of takes the form of , then
the per-capita stock of real balances can be ex-
pressed as
.
(25)
If the equilibrium price function takes the form
of , then (23), if both sides are
multiplied by , can be written as
, (26)
or, as
,. (27)
where is subsumed. By letting and
(or and )
rewrite this as
. (28)
Writing the joint density function of and as
and the density function of conditional
on as , (28) can be transformed to
. (29)
Now, Lucas proves that (29) has exactly one con-
tinuous solution on such that
(as seen in (25), is the stock of real bal-
ances per capita) is bounded, which is strictly
positive and continuously differentiable, and that
is the unique equilibrium
price function. Thus, Lucas has shown that in his
model there exists a unique rational expectations
equilibrium function in the form of
(Theorem 1).
If the equilibrium price function is given by
(24), then, the young agent, having observed the
per-capita stock of money m, should be able to tell
that an increase in the market price must have
been caused by an increase in either m or , or
both. But, the effect of cannot be separated
into two isolated effects, one attributed to and
the other to . Tha tis, if the market price and the
per-capita stock of money are not changing pro-
portionally, a change in the ratio of the two must
have been caused by a change in , but the ef-
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fects of these two factors are confounded ;
can increase when increases as well as when
decreases, or even when and change dispro-
portionately. If so, the agent is forced to hedge
against the price change that may have been
caused by a change in . If agents know that the
price change is entirely due to an increase in
money supply , then their decisions on how
many hours to work and how much to consume
and save will remain the same as before the price
change. If the young, with this knowledge, have
decided to save so much for their second period,
then this saving will inflate at the same rate as
the price, hence, there is no reason for them to
change the amount to be saved. If the saving does
not change, neither do labor and consumption.
Thus, the neutrality of money comes through as
long as is known with certainty. But, if the
young do not know whether the price inflation
was caused by an increase in money supply (a
change in ) o rby a real shock (a change in ),
they end up increasing their working hours, re-
ducing consumption, and increasing saving to
take advantage of the higher price (but not as
much as when they know that a price increase is
caused entirely by a real shock). Or, in more gen-
eral terms, depending on what they know or do
not know about what is causing the price in-
crease, the decisions of the young will be affected
or not affected. All this suggests that the mone-
tary authorities are not in a position to influence
the decisions of the young persistently in favor of
more output because it is only through the con-
founding of the real and nominal shocks that the
young produce more and because such confound-
ing will disappear if the authorities engage in an
inflationary policy on a persistent basis. No
authorities will rely on such confounding to affect
the level of production.
On the issue of whether a Phillips curve is a
tradeoff between inflation and unemployment in
the long-run, Milton Friedman proposed a theory
that the unemployment rate returns to its natural
rate via adaptative expectations (the natural rate
hypothesis). If a short-run Phillips curve is drawn
under the assumption that the expected inflation
rate remains unchanged, it shows that any reduc-
tion in the unemployment rate, caused by expan-
sionary monetary shocks, is accompanied by a
higher inflation rate, but because this curve is
downward-sloped, the higher inflation rate must
exceed the expected inflation rate which is held
fixed. Therefore, with the expected adapting to
the actual, the short-run Phillips curve shifts up-
ward, causing the actual to get ahead of the ex-
pected again. When the latter catches up with
the actual, the unemployment rate returns to its
natural rate with no gains. If the unemployment
is to be kept below its natural rate, an ever ex-
pansionary money supply is needed, but that im-
plies that the gap between the actual and the ex-
pected will never close, hence accelerating the in-
flation rate. Thus, any persistent attempt to re-
duce the unemployment rate below its natural
rate will not succeed ; it only causes inflation to
accelerate. This is Friedman’s view of the Phillips
curve［see Friedman (1968)］．His theory warns
that any expansionary policy that is not consis-
tent with the natural rate of unemployment will
only end up with accelerating inflation with no
gain. In contrast, Lucas, in this paper, constructed
an equilibrium model under rational expectations,
in which randomized monetary shocks can have
real effects in the short-run through hedging on
the part of producing agents who observe mar-
ket equilibrium prices that are confounded. Such
effects dissipate as the producing agents get hold
of enough information that informs the state of
money supply. Notice that the notion of rational
expectations per se does not imply that the effects
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of an unanticipated increase in money supply are
negated because the agents identify their expec-
tations with the objective probability distribution
of future prices. It is perfectly possible for money
to be nonneutral under rational expectations in
Lucas’s island model, for agents with rational ex-
pectations cannot isolate real from nominal price
changes. In Lucas’ model as well as in Friedman’s
theory, the efficacy of monetary policies to re-
duce the employment rate below its natural rate,
or, equivalently, to raise the level of real GDP
above its natural output, is seriously compro-
mised.
Lucas considers two special cases : (1) when
takes the value 1, which means that there are no
real shocks in the island model, and (2) when
takes the value 1, which implies that there are no
monetary disturbances :
Case 1 : when
This is the case in which the population of the
young generation is divided equally between the
two islands. Combining this with the fact that the
old generation is divided equally between them
(to keep the nominal demand for goods at the
same level), we see that the two island economies
are identical. Let . We recall that the equi-
librium price function was written as
. Hence, with , this price
function reduces to
. (30)
What form does take now? We know that
once a young agent decides on how much money
(in real terms) to take into his second period (that
is, once is determined), the agent knows how
many hours to work and how much to consume
(the former increases and the latter decreases
with ). If the marginal utility of consumption
is bounded between zero and infinity,
there must be the real balances such that the
marginal utility of consumption this period and
the marginal utility of consumption next period
are balanced, i.e., . More precisely,
we know : is an increasing function starting
from a positive value , is a diminishing
function with , and .
Hence there must be a unique such that
. With this , consider the form
, so that the equilibrium price function
may be written as
. (31)
Notice that if the young agent wants to equalize
the marginal utility of consumption between the
two periods by choosing (as the stock of real
balances to be taken to the next period), then the
equilibrium price makes
a feasible choice this period as well as the next
period, for it holds that
. (32)
To check whether the equilibrium price function
(31) meets the equi-marginal principle, write this
principle again.
Substituting and
into this principle, we have
, i.e.,
.
(33)
We know that is observed, and is fixed,
hence after observing the price
, becomes known, which means that the
right hand side of (33) can be written as
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.(34)
Since , we ge t
. (35)
Because was chosen so that ,
(35) is satisfied. Since there is only one function
that satisfies the equi-marginal principle (23), the
equilibrium price function is uniquely determined
as
. (36)
If the equilibrium price function is
, then this price is proportional to with
the proportionality constant given by . If
changes by , there will be a proportional
change in the price by
. (37)
Also, the real balances under this equilibrium
price function equals .
. (38)
What (38) shows is that if (no randomization
on the distribution of the young agents), the
young will choose in such a way the real bal-
ances equals , which equalizes the marginal
utility of consumption between the two periods.
The market equilibrium price function results in
, and it is confirmed that the
amount of real balances that the young takes to
the next period remains constant at . If this
amount is constant, so are labor (production) and
consumption. Therefore, if , a change in
changes the equilibrium price proportionally as in
(37). Monetary shocks remain neutral to the
young agent’s decisions on labor (production),
consumption, saving, and real balances (to be
taken to the second period).
Case 2 :
Consider next another special case, in which
the money supply remains fixed (i.e., ). In
this case, the equilibrium price function takes the
form of
. (39)
Since is known, the market price informs the
agents about the true value of . The real bal-
ances that the young agent decides to take to his
second period at market equilibrium now equals
where . (40)
This shows how the amount of real balances to
be taken to next period ( ) changes with .
This relation can be captured by the elasticity of
with respect to . If this elasticity is less
than 1, changes by less than % when
changes by %. Take the derivative of with
respect to .
(41)
where the elasticity of with respect to
is given by
.
Hence, it follows that if and only
if , which means that the stock of real
balances that the young agent takes to his second
period goes up with , i.e., with a fall in . That is,
if and only if . (42)
It can be shown that the elasticity lies between
zero and one in Lucas’ model, hence it holds that
. This implies that the amount of
real balances the young agent takes to his second
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period falls with a rise in , which implies that la-
bor (hence production) decreases and consump-
tion rises. Fig. 1 shows the reason ; a fall in real
balances shifts the budget line upward, hence op-
timal labor falls and optimal consumption rises.
What happens in Lucas’s model is that as the
number of the young sent to Island 1 increases,
the price of consumption of the first period falls in
Island 1, which implies that it takes more units of
consumption of the first period to get a unit of
consumption of the second period. With this rise
in the price of the second period consumption,
there will be less incentives for production and
saving ; that is, labor (production) falls and con-
sumption increases in the first period. This result
is counter to what we expect from positive real
shocks in an economy, as such shocks make it
possible for the economy to produce more in-
come, which will be allocated to raise consump-
tion over multiple periods. This rather counter in-
tuitive outcome results from a specific feature of
Lucas’s parable economy. Having found that the
optimal levels of labor, consumption, and hence
saving are determined as functions of in this
case, we may let them be denoted by , ,
and , where , , and
.
The case of Friedman’s k-percent rule (which
fixes the rate of growth of money supply at k-
percent) is a special case in which is fixed. If
money supply grows at k-percent, remains con-
stant at rate , hence we have
. (43)
Taking the derivative of this with respect to
gives
where . (44)
Again, whether how changes with depends
on the elasticity ; i.e., if and
only if . implies that, for
the young agent, production (labor) goes down
and consumption goes up with a rise in . We
may, therefore, write the optimal levels of labor,
consumption, and saving in this case as functions
of as in the case of ; let them be de-
noted by , , and , where
, , and .
Let these two special cases be summarized. If
, all price changes can be attributed to
changes in the quantity of money supply. The
equilibrium price function takes the form of
where satisfies .
On the other hand, if , the equilibrium price
function takes the form of
where is a function whose elasticity lies
between zero and one. With such elasticity, it
holds that , so that an increase in
lowers the equilibrium demand for real bal-
ances, with a rise in consumption demand and a
fall in labor supply. The same can be said of the
case with Friedman’s -percent rule.
Thus, Lucas made the point that if and are
both random variables, the market equilibrium
function cannot fully inform
the young agents whether a change in the mar-
ket price is due to a change in or in . Such con-
founded information causes hedging on the part
of the young agents, who increase the amount of
real balances to take to their second period,
hence increasing labor (production), reducing con-
sumption, and increasing saving as the market
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price rises. The opposite is the case whenever the
market equilibrium price falls. The higher equi-
librium price gives the young agents more incen-
tives to supply output, but at the same time mak-
ing consumption more expensive and saving less
so ; the lower equilibrium price, on the other
hand, gives the young agents less incentives to
supply output, making consumption less expen-
sive and saving more expensive.
If the market equilibrium price is imperfect in
the sense of Lucas’ model, the island economy
produces more output when prices rise and less
output when prices fall. To say the same thing,
the island economy produces more output under
inflation and less output under deflation. If so,
then plotting this relationship between inflation
and output from the data generated by this hypo-
thetical economy may indicate a Phillips curve
type relationship in each island. But, as the the-
ory makes clear, it does not offer us any tradeoff
between inflation and output (or unemployment)
that policy makers can rely upon. If the monetary
authorities increase money supply but keep it se-
cret to the public, it might be thought that the
authority could control the economy at their dis-
cretion. But, since the authorities publish the
quantity of money supply, if only with a time lag,
the public can keep track of it, hence any attempt
to boost the economy by persistent positive nomi-
nal shocks will be anticipated by agents fully,
hence will loose its efficacy. In Lucas’ model,
monetary shocks are random, therefore the
monetary authorities cannot use such shocks as a
policy tool to control the economy. If the authori-
ties fix the growth rate of money supply at a
given level , then labor (production), consump-
tion, and saving change in accordance with
, , and as takes on differ-
ent values.
We should keep in mind that whenever in-
creases so that more young agents are sent to Is-
land 1, fewer young agents are sent to Island 2.
Hence, an increase in the productive capacity of
Island 1 is accompanied by a decrease in the pro-
ductive capacity of Island 2. If stays constant at
one, the price falls in Island 1 ; labor (production)
decreases, consumption increases, and saving de-
creases. In Island 2, the price rises ; hence, labor
(production) increases, consumption decreases,
and saving increases. Since these are all in per-
capital terms, the combined total output of
the two islands must be
, (30)
where is per-capita production in Island 1
with ; is per-capita production in
Island 2 with . If we take the derivative
of with respect to gives
.
(31)
Hence, whether the total output increases or de-
creases depends on the relative magnitudes of
the two derivatives on the right side, i.e., on
whether an increase in output in Island 1 (as
falls) is more or less than a fall in output in Island
2. If is distributed normally with mean 1 and a
small variance, then the total output varies
around mean with a corresponding small
variance. But, again if this information is con-
founded with random monetary shocks , the ef-
fects of and cannot be isolated completely in
the eyes of the young agents.
Lucas’ model is a precursor to the later devel-
opment of real business cycle models. Such mod-
els attempt to mimic the performance of the
economy by building a model that is calibrated to
make it resemble the real economy in its basic
features and by modeling the stochastic process
of technological innovations (real shocks). In Lu-
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cas’ model, if the information on the nominal
shocks (money supply shocks) are completely
known to the agents, real decisions (on produc-
tion, consumption, and saving) are solely deter-
mined by real shocks in each island, and the to-
tal output of the economy depends only on the
value of . Such forms of real shocks are specific
to Lucas’s model, and, as pointed out above, may
invite counter-intuitive results. Lucas’s concern in
this paper, among others, was to see how mone-
tary shocks create fluctuations in the economy
through confounding of nominal and real shocks
(or absolute and relative prices). But, to the ex-
tent that real and nominal shocks are explicitly
introduced into a single aggregative model based
on intertemporal optimization and rational expec-
tations, Lucas’ fable model has made a lasting im-
pact on the modeling of an economy as a stochas-
tic process, which culminated in real business cy-
cle theory after the publication of Kydland and
Prescott’s seminal paper (1982), as well as in a
new inquiry into an economy as a time-series
process with the testing of a unit root hypothesis
［see Hall (1978) and Nelson and Plosser (1982)］.
Lucas’ model has an important implication for a
possible Phillips curve. Suppose we attempted to
fit a curve on a set of data generated from the Lu-
cas’ model. Since higher inflation leads to higher
output, we would expect that a positive relation
would obtain between the two. Consider a regres-
sion :
(32)
where is real GNP in period ; is the im-
plicit GNP deflator in period ; is an independ-
ent and identically distributed random variable
with mean 0. In Lucas’s model, real and nominal
GNP from t he t wo islands amount to :
(33)
. (34)
Take a logarithm of these, treat them as func-
tions of and , expand them about
where , and discard
the second and higher order terms from this ex-
pansion, to obtain
, (35)
, (36)
wehre and are the elasticities of functions n
and evaluated at . The approximate probabil-
ity limit of the estimated coefficient of (32)
may be computed by making use of (35) and (36),
as
. (37)
Lucas notes that a near perfect fit can be ob-
tained by eliminating negative serial correlation
in the estimated residuals by adding . As
is positive, there appears to be a positive rela-
tion between price increases and output. If
money supply is increased, the price level rises,
but output (labor) increases to the extent the
agents cannot separate the real from monetary
disturbances. Thus, Lucas’s island model can gen-
erate data what will confirm the existence of a
Phillips curve, but this relationship is elusive, for
it is not possible to increase output by running in-
flation perpetually. The augmented Phillips curve
theory of Friedman and Phelps negated the exis-
tence of a long-run tradeoff between inflation and
output under adaptive expectations. Lucas
equally negates the existence of a similar tradeoff
under rational expectations. In the former theory,
output rises above its natural level provided that
adaptive expectations lag behind actual inflation ;
output returns to its natural level with the catch-
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ing up of expectations. If expectations were
formed rationally in the Friedman-Phelps model,
it would be impossible for expectations to lag be-
hind actual inflation, because the real wage rate
that firms are willing to pay matches the real
wage rate that workers expect. This implies that
output remains at its natural level under rational
expectations. In Lucas’s model, production also
returns to its natural level, if this is defined as the
level of output that would obtain when monetary
disturbances are known to agents. But, output
could still differ from this natural level if mone-
tary disturbances are not fully identified. In both
models, we may say that it is only unanticipated
price changes that can cause the economy to de-
viate from its natural output.
In his paper, Lucas also addressed whether
Friedman’s k-percent rule is Pareto optimal. If the
monetary authorities follow a rule, agents know
ahead of time what policies will be pursued in the
future, hence can make intertemporal plans with-
out worrying about being surprised. On the other
hand, if the authorities change their policies at
their discretion, agents will be forced to revise
their plans every time such changes are made,
and the cost of such revision cannot be ignored.
More importantly, discretionary policies increase
risk and uncertainty of the decision making envi-
ronment, which makes agents’ planning unneces-
sarily difficult and unpredictable. Friedman and
Schwartz, through their extensive study on the
monetary history of the United States, gave
many episodes of misguided monetary policies.
Lucas’s analysis on this question proceeds as
follows. If the growth rate of money supply is k-
percent, the gross rate of growth of money sup-
ply, , equals . Under the rule, the
equilibrium price function re-
veals what the value of is whenever and
are observed. Hence, the young agent in Island 1
takes into his second period real balances of the
amount
, (38)
which shows that it depends only on . Hence, as
we observed above, the young agent’s labor (pro-
duction), consumption, and saving can be written
as functions of . Let them be denoted by ,
, and , respectively. And, let the con-
sumption of the old in Island 1 be . Since
there are old agents in Island 1, the total con-
sumption of the old amounts to . On
the other hand, there are young agents in
Island 1 ; their total saving amounts to
. This total saving must equal
the total consumption of the old, i.e.,
, hence, with cancelled
from both sides, it holds :
. (39)
Let , , and be written as a trip-
let : (call this triplet an allo-
cation), and compare this with any other feasible
triplet . We say
is Pareto optimal if and only if the follow-
ing conditions are satisfied :
(1) is feasible.
(2) There exists no other feasible triplet
which is Pareto superior to
. (The concept of Pareto superiority
will be defined below.)
In order for any triplet, , to
be feasible, it has to satisfy the condition :
, that is,
. This condition can also be
stated as
, (40)
which means that what the young agent pro-
duces must be no less than the total of his
own consumption and the consumption of the old.
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Recall that is a random variable with a density
function defined on the interval (0, 2).
To define the concept of Pareto superiority,
suppose that for a feasible allocation
, the following three conditions are satisfied
compared with (an allocation
that obtains from optimization by the young un-
der Friedman’s k-percept rule).
(1) for any
(the utility with is at least as
high as the utility with for any
value of ).
(2) (the consumption of the old un-
der is at least as high as the
consumption under ).
(3) There exists a subset of the interval (0, 2) in
which the density function takes a positive
value (i.e., ) and in which either
or .
If a feasible allocation is found
which satisfies these three conditions, we say
that is Pareto superior to
. It means that when
is compared with
, if the utility of the young agent is no less
in the former than in the latter, and if the con-
sumption of the old is no less in the former than
in the latter, and if for some domain of the distri-
bution of for which the density is positive,
either the utility of the young or the consumption
of the old is higher in the former than in the lat-
ter, then we say that the first is Pareto superior
to the second. If it is claimed that
is Pareto optimal, we need to show
that there exists no feasible triplet that is Pareto
superior to .
The proof is done by showing that if a triplet
that is Pareto superior to ex-
isted, a contradiction would follow. First, we note
that and in and the
amount of money that the young agent takes to
his second period, , are the solutions to
the maximization problem :
subject to : .
Since the equilibrium price is uniquely deter-
mined as , the saving by the
young is determined at
. (41)
Hence, the average consumption of the old, under
this saving, equals
.
(42)
Now consider any other feasible allocation
. Under this allocation, the
amount of money that the young takes to his sec-
ond period in nominal terms equals
,
(43)
where is assume to equal the maximum
consumption of the old that the saving of the
young can support (i.e., ).
But, is not optimal for the
young, for the optimal choice of the young is
uniquely determined as .
Therefore, comparing with
, the following inequality holds :
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(44)
But, if and
for all , it follows :
(45)
If, on top of this, it holds either
or for a subset of
on which the density is positive, condi-
tion (45) is strengthened with strict inequality.
.
(46)
With (43) used on the right side, this can be writ-
ten as
.
(47)
This contradicts (44), which is based on the opti-
mality condition. This completes the proof that
there does not exist any feasible allocation
that is Pareto superior to
. That is, the allocation under
the k-percent rule is Pareto optimal. More pre-
cisely, the market equilibrium price under the k-
percent rule brings about an allocation
, to which no other feasible allo-
cation can be Pareto superior
to it.
What Lucas demonstrated here suggests that
discretionary policies may not bring about an
equilibrium allocation that is Pareto-superior to
what obtains under a fixed rule. Discretionary
policies disorient economic agents as the authori-
ties renege their previous commitment and start
something new. Faced with unforeseen policy
changes, agents must protect themselves against
unpredictable changes. To make the matter
worse, while the authorities are held accountable
for their policies, it is not easy for anybody to
demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt how effec-
tive their new policies will be for the situation at
hand. In the case of monetary policies, there is al-
ways a lag before their effectiveness shows up. In
the face of all such difficulties, the monetary
authorities may adopt a rule by looking at the
growth trend of the economy and supplying
money at a rate consistent with this trend. Fried-
man’s k-percent rule eliminates the uncertainty of
monetary policies. Elimination of this uncertainty
allows agents to focus on real shocks or relative
prices. Innovations are the source of the dynamic
development of any capitalist economy ［see
Schumpeter (1942)］．Because a capitalist econ-
omy is mediated by money, an important task of
the monetary authorities is to supply money
without creating unnecessary disturbances, so
that real decisions can be made efficiently when
real innovations are introduced into the economy.
In the case of Lucas’s model, this amounts to
eliminating the confusion between the nominal
price level and relative prices.
6. Conclusion
We have examined and reviewed the contribu-
tions of Lucas’ 1972 and 1976 papers on expecta-
tions and the neutrality of money and economet-
ric policy evaluation, from a historical perspective
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in the light of the pressing questions of the 1960 s.
Muth introduced the idea of rational expectations
as a way of endogenizing expectations as early as
1961, but macroeconomists were still thinking in
terms of adaptive expectations and econometric
policy evaluation along the line advanced by Tin-
bergen. Adaptive expectations are based on the
idea of correcting a mistake, therefore backward-
looking as such expectations are essentially de-
termined by the past prices. Large macroecono-
metric models, popular at the time, were focused
on uncovering structural parameters from the
past data, and they were used to forecast the fu-
ture state of an economy and applied to simulate
and evaluate economic policies. The idea of adap-
tive expectations and the basic stance of macro-
econometrics of the time are, however, not consis-
tent with the basic tenet of the decision making
modes of intertemporally motivated agents. Lu-
cas’ insight was that intertemporal optimization
calls for a totally different approach to modeling
of agents’ decision making and the formation of
expectations, and to modeling of an economy of
such agents. His critique of econometric policy
evaluation stunned the profession by his clear
demonstration that the modes of decision making
under a policy regime cannot be captured by the
idea of a fixed mode that can be uncovered by
econometric methods applied to the data from
the past, alerting the profession to the fact that
the modes of decision making and a policy regime
cannot be separated.
In his 1972 paper, Lucas built an equilibrium
model of a monetary economy with overlapping
generations in which a fiat money is used as a
medium of exchange as well as a store of value,
and in which expectations of future prices are ra-
tionally formed. He demonstrated how it is possi-
ble to analyze the neutrality of money in an equi-
librium model in which market prices play a guid-
ing role in agents’ decisions on labor (production),
consumption, saving, and the demand for money.
His model gave an answer to the age-old question
of why monetary disturbances could affect real
output of an economy in the short-run while the
neutrality of money is retained in the long-run. It
also related the demand for money to the deci-
sions on production (labor), consumption, and sav-
ing, along the line of Friedman’s theory that all
decisions, whether on consumption and saving or
on the acquisition of assets, real or financial, origi-
nate in agents’ concern for wealth. By deriving
the demand for money from the principle that the
marginal utility of consumption this period be
equated with the expected marginal utility of
consumption of the next period, and by equating
this demand with the supply of money, he de-
rived the equilibrium price as ‘a function’ of state
variables, and extended it to expectations of fu-
ture equilibrium prices. This has made it possible
to derive rational expectations as equilibrium ex-
pectations. If Lucas’s model were used to gener-
ated data on output and prices, and if a regres-
sion equation relating output to price changes
were estimated, such estimation would reveal a
positive correlation (or a negative correlation be-
tween unemployment rate and inflation as in the
Phillips curve). But, the estimated curve does not
promise any tradeoff between inflation and out-
put (or unemployment), since any attempt to
boost output beyond its natural level (or reduce
unemployment below its natural rate) by accom-
modating inflation will make it predictable to
agents.
Lucas’ analysis distinguished three cases : the
case in which the monetary authorities make the
quantity of money known to all agents while ran-
dom real shocks occur, the case in which this
quantity is left random but with no real shocks,
and the case in which both real and nominal dis-
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turbances are random. The three cases were
shown to give rise to different decisions of agents.
This is a first demonstration that the decision
rules of intertemporally motivated agents are not
invariant to policy regimes. It foreshadowed a full-
fledged discussion in his 1976 paper on a critique
of econometric policy evaluation. His analysis of
the optimality of Friedman’s k-percent rule was
also the first attempt to address monetary policy
rules from the perspective of the optimality in
agents’ decision making, hence from the perspec-
tive of an allocation that results from market
equilibrium, rather than from that of the optimal-
ity with respect to the criterion of the monetary
authorities. Lucas’s proof that the equilibrium al-
location under Friedman’s k-percent rule is Pareto
optimal stands as a strong case for rule-based
policies.
The two papers by Lucas turned us around on
the fundamental issue as to how to model the de-
cision making modes of intertemporally moti-
vated agents as related to the environment in
which decisions are made, and how to model the
interdependence of the two in a consistent way.
His insight made it possible to go beyond a struc-
tural view of an economy with stable behavioral
equations awaiting, to be uncovered by the appli-
cation of econometric methods, to a more fluid
view that an economy is a process in which
agents’ decision making modes, a policy regime,
and innovations are intimately intertwined in de-
termining its stochastic process. The subsequent
development of economics is a clear evidence of
how revolutionary this insight was. The spirit of
the two papers stands as a constant reminder of
the importance of creative thinking in economics
as a moral science.
Footnotes
1. Heidegger writes :
Coming back to itself futurally, resoluteness
brings itself into the Situation by making pre-
sent. The character of “having been” arises
from the future, and in such a way that the fu-
ture which “has been” (or better, which “is in
the process of having been”) releases from itself
the Present. This phenomenon has the unity of
a future which makes present in the process of
having been ; we designate it as “temporality”.
Only in so far as Dasein has the definite charac-
ter of temporality, is the authentic potentiality-
for-Being-a-Whole of anticipatory resoluteness,
as we have described it, made possible for
Dasein itself. Temporality reveals itself as the
meaning of authentic care.
Heidegger (1962, §326, p. 374)
2. Later on, the natural rate theory has developed into
the structuralist theory of unemployment or em-
ployment［see Phelps (1994, 1995)］．This theory
looks at the demand curve for labor, as affected by
the value of the assets of the firm as well as by the
wealth of labor in terms of their productivity, and
the supply curve of labor, as determined by the in-
centive wage (to reduce shirking, quitting, or turn-
over)-whether it arises from the problem of asym-
metric information a la Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or
labor turnover in search for better jobs a la Salop
(1979) or by the efficiency wage a la Solow (1979)
and Akerlof and Yellen (1985a, 1985b)-as well as by
the wealth of the employees. Heeding the fact that
the natural rate of unemployment is trendless de-
spite the technological advances, the theory ex-
plains how this rate may be affected by productivity
advances or supply shocks while such effects are of
short duration. The theory is dynamic (intertempo-
ral) in nature as wealth and the value of assets
owned by firms and households, which are affected
by the market interest rate, play a crucial role, and
is closely related to the natural rate of interest a la
Wicksell (1898). Basically, the natural rate of unem-
ployment is explained as a steady phenomenon in
which expectations are actualized, hence is inter-
twined with the natural rate of interest. For Aus-
trian elements in the structuralist theory of unem-
ployment, see Zimmermann (2007).
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3. Phelps (2007) argues that the concept of rational ex-
pectations is inappropriate for a highly innovative
economy, where agents each think differently and
the future is shaped by the innovations themselves
and injected with new uncertainties, and that an
economy with the dynamism of incessant innova-
tions cannot be adequately modeled by incorporat-
ing rational expectations as Lucas did in his 1972 pa-
per. He writes :
Last but not least, positing rational expecta-
tions equilibrium is not just inaccurate as a way
to close the model in the same sense as postulat-
ing rational choice is taken to be inaccurate : it
is inappropriate to impose on the model. In a
highly innovative economy and thus one sub-
ject to change, firms-even firms in the same in-
dustry and location-are all thinking differently.
So a firm would have no grounds to reason, as it
implicitly does in rational-expectations theory,
that “since I have calculated I must raise my
wages by x percent, I should now take into ac-
count that my competitors are planning to do
the same ; so I must now adjust wage increase
even more... .” This kind of inductive reasoning
to arrive at the right expectations is inapplica-
ble. That is the thesis of my piece (Phelps 1983)
in the Frydman-Phelps volume (1983).
More fundamentally, the public cannot form
“rational expectations” about future probability
distributions when the future is being created
currently by the new ideas and consequent
plans of entrepreneurs to which the public has
no access and of which the entrepreneurs them-
selves are uncertain (Calvo and Phelps 1977). If
firms are engaging in creative activity, “run-
ning regressions” on past data will not give a
firm an applicable prediction of what these
firms are planning now to do in any respect (see
Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg, forthcom-
ing). Understanding Keynes-Fellner probabili-
ties for use under uncertainty, one gives less
weight to historical projections of what they are
up to when one understands that they are pre-
paring a surprise.
So, if asked whether my theory was super-
seded by the Lucas model, I would have to say
that if an economy possesses dynamism, so that
fresh uncertainties incessantly flow from its in-
novative activities and its structure is ever-
changing, the concept of rational expectations
equilibrium does not apply and a model of such
an economy that imposes this concept cannot
represent at all well the mechanism of such an
economy’s fluctuations.
Phelps (2007, p.548)
Frydman and Phelps (1983, Introduction) discuss
many difficult problems of expectations formation.
Acknowledging the attractiveness of the rational
expectations hypothesis, they point out that the ba-
sis problem of this hypothesis lies in the very fact
that the relevant economic theory is missing that
can provide the decision making agents with the ob-
jective probability distribution of outcomes. In this
economy, the uncertainty introduced by unique
events (Knight, 1921, p. 321), the development of in-
numerable future states, and the beauty contest in
the stock market, all refuse any assignment of an ob-
jective probability distribution (Keynes, 1921, p. 34 ;
1937, p. 214) (the quotes theirs). To make the
matter worse, one needs to contend with the fact
that knowledge is dispersed among different indi-
viduals (Hayek, 1948, pp. 77-78) (the quote theirs),
which makes forecasting the average opinion diffi-
cult. Thus, it was with a reason that adaptive expec-
tations were introduced to deal with such an envi-
ronment. In the same book, Phelps (1983, pp. 31-41)
considers an alternative theory that allows other
agents’ expectations to differ from agents’ own ex-
pectations and analyzes the possibility of disinflation
without causing a recession.
Moreover, the theory of rational expectations
faces the problem of how to forecast the forecasts
(or beliefs) of others［Townsend (1983)］or an the
problem of an infinite recursion of belief formation
vis-à-vis the beliefs of other agents ; see Lucas (1975)
on how this problem might be avoided by pooling in-
formation. Pealman and Sargent (2005) showed that
there is a recursive representation of equilibrium in
Townsend’s model.
4. The meaning of this condition can be understood by
40
the following reasoning. The budget constraint that
the young faces for any given amount of money bal-
ances (to be taken to the second period) is given
by , so that this constraint in the c-n space
has slope 1. Since the slope of the indifference curve
of is given by , the indiffer-
ence curve that is tangent to the budget line must
have slope 1 at the point of tangency, that is,
, which gives . Taking the de-
rivative of the slope of the indifference curve with
respect to c gives
. Substituting into this the condition
(i.e., the condition that the slope of the in-
difference curve is 1 at the point of tangency), this
derivative can be written as ,
which has the opposite sign to that of . This
term can be written as . If
is positive, it means that the slope of the indifference
curve gets smaller for a fixed n, which implies that
the new optimal point, if the budget line shifts up-
ward, must have a greater value of n and a smaller
value of c. This means that both leisure and con-
sumption are inferior goods, which contradicts the
assumption that both are not such goods. Likewise,
the derivative of the indifference curve with respect
to n and substituting the condition , the
derivative of the slope of the indifference curve is
given by . If
, which can be written as ,
is positive, the slope of the indifference curve in-
creases as n increases while c is fixed. This implies
that if the budget line shifts upward, consumption
declines and n increases, which contradicts the as-
sumption that consumption is not an inferior good.
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